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Résumé 
Cet essai a pour objet le rôle de la notion de fiction dans les domaines de l’art et de la 
science.  Essentiellement, je soutiens que « fiction »  dans ce contexte est « a category 
mistake » (concept versus genre) et je crois que cet essai peut réussir à « cuire du pain 
philosophique » en dévoilant une dispute verbale. Je suggère donc de clore un débat 
philosophique dans son intégralité. Je présente un exposé du style de fictionnalisme abordé 
par Catherine Z. Elgin et Nelson Goodman (que ce soit dans le contexte des arts ou des 
sciences, nous parvenons à la compréhension grâce à des fictions sous formes de « vérités 
non littérales ») et j’explore le concept de la fiction. Je soutiens que les représentations 
(textes descriptifs de toutes sortes, incluant les modèles) sont constituées d’éléments 
fictionnels et d’éléments facettés (à l’exception de la version idéale possible ou impossible, 
c’est-à-dire dans l’esprit de Dieu, qui n’inclurait que les facettes.) La compréhension ne 
peut provenir de la fiction, mais plutôt d’éléments facettés ordonnés de manière à créer une 
compréhension qui conduit généralement à des prédictions, des explications et des 
manipulations. Je définis les facettes comme ayant des caractéristiques organisées,  alors 
que les fictions ont des caractéristiques désorganisées. La fiction dans son intégralité est 
donc, par définition, l’expression du néant (of nothing), ou en matière de langues idéales 
(mathématiques), l’expression de contradiction. Les fictions et les facettes relèvent des 
représentations qui sont elles-mêmes primitives. Les textes descriptifs sont donc fictionnels 
par degré. Les récits qui sont très fictionnels ont une certaine valeur (souvent ludique) mais 
contiennent toujours au moins une facette. En fin de compte, toutes les activités 
représentationnelles devraient être considérées irréelles, incomplètes, bien que parfois 
connectées à la réalité, c’est-à-dire, prises entre une description réaliste facettée et une 
fiction dans son intégralité. 
 
 
Mots-clés : fictions, facettes, fictionnalisme, art, science, l’irrealisme. 
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Abstract 
This essay concerns fiction in art and science.  I argue that the term ‘fiction’ used in 
this manner is a category mistake (concept versus genre) and I believe this essay may 
succeed in “baking philosophical bread” by recognizing a verbal dispute. I am, therefore, 
suggesting an entire thread of discussion be re-evaluated. I provide an exposé of Catherine 
Z. Elgin and Nelson Goodman’s brand of fictionalism (i.e. that we glean understandings in 
the arts and sciences from fictions in the form of non-literal truth) and concentrate on 
unpacking the concept of fiction. I argue that representations (narratives of all sorts 
including models) are made of both fictional elements and faceted elements (with the 
exception of the possible or impossible ideal version e.g. God’s, which, would include only 
facets). Understandings are not gleaned from fictions but rather from faceted elements so 
ordered as to create understanding and usually leading to predictions, explanations, and 
manipulations. I define facets as ordered features whereas fictions (the genre) are groupings 
of disordered features. Full fiction is, therefore, by definition the expression of nothing or 
with respect to ideal languages (mathematics), the expression of 
contradiction. Representations are primitives and both fictions and facets are parts of them. 
Narratives are thus fictional by degree. Narratives which are highly fictional are of value 
(often playful) but they still always contain at least one facet. Ultimately all 
representational activity should be regarded as irreal i.e. incomplete although sometimes 
connected to reality and caught between a perfectly faceted realist description and complete 
fiction. 
 
Keywords : fictions, facets, fictionalism, art, science, irrealism.  
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For Joséane and my late mother, Livia... 
As [the mathematicians] are telling me the conditions of the theorem, I construct something 
that fits all the conditions.  You know, you have a set.... one ball... disjoint... two balls.  
Then the balls turn colours, grows hairs...  Finally, they state the theorem... which is some 
dumb thing about the ball, which isn’t true for my hairy green ball thing, so I say “False”!   
Richard P. Feynman 
Nous n’héritons pas de la terre de nos ancêtres, nous l’empruntons à nos enfants. (proverbe 
africain cité dans Terre des Hommes de Saint-Exupéry. 
Art is not a copy of the real world. One of the damn things is enough. credited to Virginia Woolf 
by a number of sources including Nelson Goodman. 
A portrait is a painting with just a tiny something wrong with the mouth. John Singer Sargent; 
American portrait artist. 
One can [say] that the atomic system behaves ‘in a certain relation’, ‘As If ...’  and ‘in a 
certain relation, ‘As If ... ,’but that is, so to speak, only a legalistic contrivance which 
cannot be turned into clear thinking. Letter from E. Schrodinger to N. Bohr, October 23, 1926 
Rien n’exige plus de vérité que la fiction. Jean Cocteau 
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Introduction 
A Note on Typography. I will refer to a concept or a category by italicizing e.g. 
fiction. I will use single quotation marks when referring to the word itself e.g. ‘fiction’. 
Double quotation marks for direct quotes e.g. Vaihinger called this “expediency”. I also 
italicize for emphasis and underline a philosophical position when introducing it. 
Goodman/Elgin Fictionalism. This essay contains an exposé of the notion of 
fiction in the works of Catherine Z. Elgin and Nelson Goodman. What is of interest herein 
is to ascertain the way that fiction in the arts is connected to fiction in the sciences by both 
philosophers. Though my study is primarily epistemological, there are many ontological 
implications involved, because the notion of fiction is generally attached to issues regarding 
what exists or is. Furthermore, as we shall see, problems normally found in philosophy of 
language are also unavoidable. However, the general question I am asking is the following: 
What sense does it make to use the word ‘fiction’ in both domains?  
This question obviously raises another question: what do we mean by ‘fiction’? 
Following Noam Chomsky, I have misgivings about an externalist project that searches to 
answer the ‘we’ question by appealing to communities that are hard to limit or define, or to 
the science of statistical analysis. This would consist in a completely different kind of 
project. We might be fairly mixed up about what we mean by ‘fiction’.  
Chomsky regains inter-subjectivity for his internalist perspective by positing that our 
internal concepts are universal. While this may seem surprising at first, it makes sense. 
How our mental machinery works is an object of scientific study beginning with the 
somewhat stunning fact that we understand each other, to a greater or lesser degree. 
Children are simply not taught how to understand. Understanding is a built-in capacity and 
the result of certain kinds of mental tasks e.g. parsing and categorizing.  Therefore, I am 
aligning myself in this work with a Chomskyan internalist perspective on the grounds that 
our concepts may imply a certain form of consistency, all of which relies on the way our 
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minds
1
 work. Understanding implies the need to make sense. This project, therefore, has an 
a priori aspect to it, however much of the a priori may be supported by empirical evidence 
found in the limitations of sentence structure and of word use.  
Thus, W. V. O. Quine’s refutation of the analytic/synthetic distinction may only 
target empiricism and behaviourism. If there is a built-in natural language module in the 
form of a universal grammar, the notion of the synthetic a priori is lurking in the wings. 
There is much that I greatly appreciate about the works of Elgin and Goodman. 
According to Israel Scheffler, Goodman’s Languages of Art “brought art and science into 
communication, providing an ingenious common framework for analyses of musical scores, 
literary scripts, scientific discourses, pictorial depictions, architecture and dance”. 2  
For any student with a background more artistic than scientific, the university 
experience can be unsettling. Often, it would seem, science is everything. As a result, many 
scholars prefer to associate themselves with the sciences than with the arts on the grounds 
that if science is everything, then why not make everything science? The opposite 
tendency, by the way, is just as common. Why not make everything art? Even mould in a 
Petri dish can be exhibited.
3
  
Although I admit that the following troublesome term has been employed in many 
other ways, I will call the tendency regarding science noted above — and in keeping with 
Hilary Putnam’s usage, scientism.4 Nonetheless, what constitutes science, at least natural 
                                                          
1
 I use ‘mind’ in the same way as Chomsky, not implying dualism, but as another word for 
functioning brain. Chomsky frequently uses the expression “mind-brain” in order to avoid 
confusion. 
2
 Scheffler, I. (2001) “My Quarrels with Nelson Goodman” p. 667. 
3
 I am far more sympathetic to anything being art than to anything being science. 
4
 Putnam, H. (1995) Renewing Philosophy.  p. x. He defines scientism as “the idea that science, and 
only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective”. 
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science may be more precise than many may believe. To be fair we could call the opposite 
tendency regarding art, artism. 
Elgin steers a thoughtful course through many extremes. Even the titles of her works 
reflect this desire—examples include Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary and 
Considered Judgement. Goodman’s Ways of World Making has been viewed by many as 
moving to an extreme. A fascinating debate occurred after its publication between Scheffler 
and Goodman regarding “star-making”. Essentially Goodman claimed that we make the 
stars and that we make the stars long ago and furthermore that we make space and time. 
Without detailing this view immediately I will use Goodman’s term irrealism to denote this 
viewpoint and so distinguish it from Elgin/Goodman fictionalism. Nonetheless, I believe 
Elgin agrees with Goodman’s star-making irrealism. As wild as this ism seems to be, I hope 
to convince my reader of its coherence.  
Sellars famously wrote, “[t]he aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to 
understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the 
broadest possible sense of the term”.5 Irrealism “hangs together” with all versions right and 
wrong as well as with those versions lost somewhere in between. Irrealism is pluralist and 
soft-relativist i.e. not the view that on being confronted with God herself, the relativist 
states, “Well, you’re entitled to your opinion!” Irrealism is not committed to anti-realism, 
realism, idealism or physicalism. Hopefully, by the end of this paper, I will have explained 
what irrealism is. 
What often fuels scientism is reductionism, in one of its many forms, based on 
another extreme: the epistemological preconception that truth reigns supreme. After all, 
what is, it is believed, must be true, and what is, is discovered by doing science.
6
 
                                                          
5
 Scharp, K. and Brandom, R. B. (eds.) (2007) In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid 
Sellars. p. 369. 
6
 Reductionism like fictionalism has a vast literature which cannot be detailed herein. 
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Elgin’s logicist approach to reductionism (i.e. theoretical reductionism) states that 
any theory A can be reduced to theory B if theory A is fully expressed by theory B and in 
fewer steps.
 7
 If what we are after is the truth then all that should count is stating the truth in 
the fewest steps possible. Elgin tells us: 
Reduction of scientific theories is often treated as a linguistic issue [...] the objects 
of the reduced theory are thus shown to be nothing but objects [...] recognized by 
the reducing theory.
 8
 
 
[I]n effect, reduction is the last step before the end of science. When all the truths 
are in and the relations between them are properly mapped, we can shut off the 
lights in the lab, close the door, and go home. But conceivably science is not like 
that. Perhaps there is no end […] To conclude that the As are nothing but Bs, and 
thus that henceforth the As may be treated as nothing but Bs, may be rash if our 
grounds are known to be […] vulnerable. [...] Moreover, the reductionist assumes 
that all genuine (non-logical) truths are discoverable by science. But if, as Goodman 
and others believe, the arts, the humanities and philosophy afford understandings 
[of] reality, which are expressible in propositions, and those understandings are not 
captured in scientific claims,  then there are genuine truths that elude reduction. And 
if the arts convey accurate insights in ways that are non-propositional (as, for 
example, pictures and music seem to), then those insights too are not candidates for 
reduction […].9 
 
                                                          
7
 Elgin’s view of reductionism is characteristically Nagelian. This is a form of logical reductionism. 
See: Nagel, E. (1949) “The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences”, p. 99-138. I thank Jean-
Pierre Marquis for reminding me that there are other forms: semantic, epistemological and 
ontological. Ontological reductionism (i.e. methodological reductionism) is parsimonious. For 
example, why assume there are minds versus brains? One reason is so that I can say “I’ve changed 
my mind” without saying “I’ve changed my brain”. This could create an intuition favouring 
semantical reductionism. Presumably there are changes in my brain which I can refer to by (and 
which mean) changes in my mind. But my brain is a mess of quantum events. We can see puzzles 
abound. The problems, I will argue, stem from the polysemous nature of the word ‘is’. 
8
 Elgin, C. Z. (1997) Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary, p.42.  
9
 Elgin, C. Z. (2009) “Construction and Cognition”, p. 138-139. 
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There are many threads that create the rich fabric of what I will call Elgin/Goodman 
Fictionalism.
10
 Generally, one of their significant views noted in the above quotation, can 
be stated as follows:  
Proposition 1— fictions in art and fictions in science are deemed highly significant 
to our ability to glean understandings.  
At the heart of this debate is the notion that fictions cannot be reduced. There is 
simply no room for them in the true-story-of-the-real. There are two problems that 
immediately come to mind:  
1) Many philosophers believe if truth is what we are after, then we must sacrifice all 
fiction.  
2) Can we simply assume that fictions in the sciences (if there are such things) are 
like fictions in the arts?  
In reference to 2), some philosophers think there is a clear connection. Believing that 
there is a connection is often associated with the term “fictionalism”. In the Stanford Online 
Encyclopaedia we read:  
Fictionalism about a region of discourse can provisionally be characterized as the 
view that claims made within that discourse are not best seen as aiming at literal 
truth but are better regarded as a sort of ‘fiction’. As we will see, this first 
characterization of fictionalism is in several ways rough. But it is a useful point of 
departure.
 11
  
Elgin and Goodman offer us one version of fictionalism and the Stanford entry is a 
fair, albeit rough and partial, characterisation of it.  
                                                          
10
 I use this expression rather than “irrealism” in order to limit inquiry, though I will employ it now 
and then. Also I do place greater emphasis on Elgin’s work in this essay, though I will refer to and 
quote Goodman frequently. 
11
 Eklund, M. (2011) “Fictionalism”,  Stanford Encycolopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism/  consulted on 11/5/2011 
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We will call this: 
 Proposition 2—Arts and sciences employ fictions in the form of non-literal truths 
from which are gleaned understandings.  
But, one could justifiably wonder whether ‘fiction’ is an apt word in relation to the 
sciences. Furthermore, we have not yet argued sufficiently for the view that the sciences 
employ fictions at all. And again, even if we do show examples of this, must we use the 
same word ‘fiction’ in both domains? 
Why accept that science employs fiction? Therefore:  
Assumption 1— Science never employs fictions. 
I also propose we immediately distinguish fictions in the arts by calling them artistic-
fictions from fictions in the sciences (although they may not exist) by calling these would-
be entities scientific-fictions.
12
 This is somewhat arbitrary I admit, but I am doing it to set 
up the idea that they may be two very distinct things. So we assume there are two as our 
starting point and attempt to find good arguments showing otherwise.  
Therefore:  
Assumption 2—Artistic fictions differ from scientific fictions (if they exist at all).  
According to Mauricio Suárez, this distinction, along with the notion that fictions are 
used in the sciences on a regular basis, can be traced back to the neo-Kantian pragmatist, 
Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933) : 
However the fictions employed in scientific reasoning are not of the same kind as 
those that appear in other areas of human endeavor. Vaihinger distinguished 
scientific fictions from other kinds of fictions (such as poetic, mythical, or religious 
                                                          
12
Mauricio Suárez uses the same terminology in his 2009 article. ‘Science fictions’ would generate 
confusion.   
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fictions), and he understood the difference to be one of function. Virtuous fictions 
play a role in a particular kind of practical rationality in scientific theorizing, a kind 
of “means–end” rationality at the theoretical level. In Vaihinger’s terminology, they 
are expedient. 
13
 
We may note that Vaihinger considered scientific fictions both “virtuous” and 
“expedient”.  Elgin, we shall see, calls them “felicitous falsehoods”.14 Both Elgin and 
Vaihinger accept that fictions exist in the sciences. However, as we shall see, Elgin, unlike 
Vaihinger, plays down the distinction between fictions in the arts and fictions in the 
sciences. There are three very powerful reasons for doing this, all of which, I believe, are 
fairly consistent with Elgin’s views:  
1) Fictions are simply wrong (false) versions whether they are scientific, artistic or 
other. 
2) There is nothing in principle that suggests artistic-fictions and other-fictions 
cannot be “expedient” and “virtuous”.  
3) There is nothing in principle that suggests scientific-fictions are necessarily 
“expedient” and “virtuous”.  
 
Suárez credits Arthur Fine with tracing the line of influence from Vaihinger’s 
“Philosophy of “As If” (als ob) to the Copenhagen Interpretation as well as to the works of 
Scheffler (1963); the doctoral advisee of Goodman’s.15 
                                                          
13
 Suárez, M. (2009) “Scientific Fictions as Rules of Inference”, p. 158. 
14
 Elgin, C. Z. (2004) “True Enough”, p. 122. 
15
 See Fine, A. (1993) “Fictionalism” p.4: “Vaihinger is usually regarded as a neo-Kantian, although 
his reading of Kant was very idiosyncratic. For example, where Kant generally considers scientific 
principles as providing the possibility of objective knowledge (i.e., as constitutive) for Vaihinger in 
large measure (although not totally) scientific principles are fictions, functioning as regulative 
ideals. Overall, Vaihinger's work, in fact, shows a strong British influence-especially due to 
Berkeley on the philosophy of mathematics and Hume on impressions and the imagination. [I]n 
many respects, Vaihinger is closer to American pragmatism than to the transcendental idealism of 
Kant. Indeed, Ralph B. Perry, and other keepers of the pragmatic tradition, identify Vaihinger, 
Williams James, and Poincare as leading pragmatist thinkers of their era”. 
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Finally, I will propose one weak thesis and one strong thesis:   
Weak Thesis Statement—both the arts and sciences can contribute to 
understanding. They are invaluable forms which may always function in radically 
different ways on radically different domains.  
Strong Thesis Statement—the arts contribute to the understanding of a domain 
that is fundamentally inaccessible to the sciences. 
In this paper I support the strong thesis as well as irrealism while denying 
Elgin/Goodman fictionalism. I therefore, accept assumption 1 i.e. that we do not glean 
understanding in science from fictions. I will also argue that we do not glean 
understandings in the arts or other domains from fictions.  
The debate ultimately rests on a category mistake: ‘fiction’ is understood in its 
conceptual form as a part of descriptive noun (an adjective modifying a noun) e.g. a 
fictional narrative. With the title of this paper: The ‘Is’ of Fiction, I imply that fictions exist 
in the way that other descriptions exist e.g. ‘tall’ or ‘smarmy’. On these grounds we do not 
learn from fictions anymore than we learn from talls. Nonetheless, we do regularly use the 
word ‘fiction’ to denote a ‘genre’ of film or novel. 
Nevertheless, I will use ‘fiction’ as though it were a noun, as others in the literature 
do, and work to show this is a misguided reference to a genre that ought to be avoided in 
this context.  
This thesis tends to be more argumentative and essay-like than is normally expected. 
I hope that I have not misrepresented the views of the philosophers I study; however, it 
appeared to me in the course of the work presented here that the problem could be framed 
in a particular way and neatly resolved. Consequently, while I begin with Elgin/Goodman 
fictionalism, I introduce work by other philosophers, e.g. Mario Bunge, Ludwig 
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Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky. Each of these philosophers raised key (in my mind) 
concerns that tie to the problem in important ways, which I would prefer not be neglected 
as it seems these concerns provide some evidence for my contention that this is a verbal 
dispute. Finally, Chomsky was Goodman’s student, and we should note that they worked in 
very different directions. The heart of my project is, I believe, in recognition of the nature 
of that significant disagreement, which is placed in the larger context of how the 
philosophy of the sciences (logical empiricism) collapsed and was to be replaced by the 
analytic tradition. 
Finally, I would like to point out that the more secondary question; the idea that art 
can and often does contribute to understanding is supported by Elgin, Goodman, Chomsky 
and Bunge. The latter two philosopher’s views on fictionalism, however, are more difficult 
to unpack. Both Chomsky and Bunge are scientific realists in differing ways and this is 
why I think they can contribute to resolving the debate. 
 
10 
 
Chapter 1 
 
1. A Preliminary Argument Against Assumption 1. Assumption 1 stated that 
science never employs fictions. This section, therefore, provides the first argument 
supporting the view that science may, very well, employ fictions.  
If we reconsider the notion of reduction for a moment, I would like to make the 
following point. Both Goodman and W. V. O. Quine raised many striking and influential 
sceptical concerns in the 20
th
 century. I will not detail these concerns here. Briefly, 
however, Quine’s indeterminacy of translation and Goodman’s new riddle of induction are 
similar. The former is initially aimed at linguistic concerns (inviting scientific implications) 
and the latter is aimed at general scientific ones. Essentially, what happens if theory A and 
theory B manage to properly express a phenomenon in two completely divergent 
languages?  
Elgin explains Goodman’s riddle as follows:  “This is the new riddle of induction [...] 
Why [...] should we accept ‘All emeralds are green’ as lawlike [and not] ‘All emeralds are 
grue’ [when] both are equally compatible with the evidence”.16  ‘Grue emeralds’ plays the 
role of stating a condition, which will possibly occur at time t and which cannot be ruled 
out. The probability of emeralds being grue may ultimately equal or exceed the probability 
that they will be green. The riddle would not be a problem if science were complete. It is a 
problem now however. We cannot know if we have over-reduced for the simple reason that 
a specific future event has not yet occurred and we cannot add provisions to the theory to 
cover for that event without expanding the theory infinitely. Domains may always remain 
distinct; worlds apart, may remain so forever. Truths in theory A may never coincide with 
truths in theory B. Goodman’s riddle is a modified version of Hume’s problem of 
induction. 
                                                          
16
 Elgin, C. Z. (1997) Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary, p.43. 
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Far more troublesome is that although we might wish to believe strongly in some law, 
we simply cannot tell if it is a work of fiction until time t. Even apparent facts could turn 
out to be fictions. This has potentially fatal consequences for our assumption 1 i.e. that 
science never employs fictions. What we think are facts of science may indeed be fictions. 
If so, we may always be using fictions or at least we have no way of knowing with certainty 
when we are not. 
Ceteris paribus conditions cannot solve Goodman’s riddle. They are simply 
conditions of agreement. If we add conditions like ‘until today’, we are on the slippery 
slope of restricting the domain to only emeralds I presently hold in my hand. Where can we 
draw the line on generalization such that it still remains a generalization? 
There are counterarguments however. 
Scientific realists like Mario Bunge, claim this is only fallibilism i.e. “the mark of 
critical realism [which is] absent from naïve realism”.17 In regard to Goodman’s riddle he 
states: “Beware appearances and artificial examples concocted just to support or undermine 
philosophical speculations”. 18 
Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim offered the Deductive nomological model of 
scientific explanation (d-n model) in which they posited that covering laws allow scientists 
to deduce from explanans (statements s of the theory s1…sn) to explanandum (phenomena 
p1… pn) providing that one of the statements is more or less “law-like”.
19
 Aside from this 
requiring a definition of law that is workable, Wesley Salmon
20
 provided significant 
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 Bunge, M.  (2006) Chasing Realities, Strife over Realism, p. 255. 
18
  ibid., p. 76. 
19
 Hempel, C. and Oppenheim P. (1948) “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, reprinted in 
Hempel, C. (1965) p. 247-248. 
20
 Salmon, W. (1971) “Statistical Explanation”, p. 29–87. 
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counterexamples. He argued that we could deduce 1) “explanatory irrelevancies” and 2) 
“explanatory asymmetries” from laws. The deduction from a law ultimately requires a 
perfectly stable law, but there is still no guarantee of an explanation. The riddle would seem 
to make all laws suspect; not in the mind-independent world, but in the world that counts to 
us, the cognitive world. The confident geologist may remain confident. We philosophers do 
the doubting by proxy. 
If there is a major difference between Elgin/Goodman-fictionalism and Bunge’s 
hylorealism (emergentist materialism), perhaps it lies in Bunge’s focus on truth as opposed 
to understanding.
21
 Understanding only a little may be preferable to believing much to be 
true. I return to my introduction; perhaps what is, is something other than what is true?  On 
these grounds, it would seem, Goodman and Elgin offer us a more minimalist and 
therefore, fallibilist account. We might ask, in what sense is the beauty of a water lily true? 
A sunset? Even if ideal science tells us what is, art may tell us what it feels like. It’s not 
clear that one can be reduced to the other for it is unclear which part, if any, is truly 
irrelevant. Again, these worlds might remain forever apart. Moreover, art may do more than 
tell us what things feel like. Thomas Nagel, in an attempt to preserve an agnostic 
Physicalism, did not try to deny the fundamental irreducibility of a bat’s experience.22 
Bunge would not either. But, emergentist idealism rather than emergentist realism is, 
arguably, just as coherent.  
                                                          
21
 Interestingly, ‘understanding’ does not appear in the index of Bunge’s Chasing Realities, Strife 
over Realism. This is only a vague thought that would require other research. In all fairness, Bunge 
is prolific and likely deals with ‘understanding’ elsewhere. Bunge offered a fascinating argument 
against Idealism in a conference on Quantum Mechanics organized by Louis Vervoort. If I 
understand it, it could be summarized by saying the real world cannot be fully known, therefore it 
cannot be made of mind.  
22
 Nagel, T. (1974) “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” p. 435-50. 
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Bunge’s main argument is not unlike the d-n model, i.e. we know what emeralds can 
or cannot do. They cannot simply change colour at time t for example. This appears to miss 
the point. The problem is epistemological and aims at theories i.e. how can we know the 
emeralds are not grue all along implying that we have only examined the green ones and 
have never examined the blue. There is as much evidence for “all emeralds are green” as 
for “all emeralds are green until some future date”. The riddle aims at the fundamental 
fictionalism inherent in all theory making. Is every theory fictional? We will see that Bunge 
draws a clear line between fictions and reality allowing for the reality of concepts; in 
particular mathematical, moral and scientific concepts. This seems to support assumption 1 
(science never employs fictions) despite Bunge’s claim that mathematical entities are 
themselves fictions. 
Another counter-argument, which possibly preserves assumption 1 (science never 
employs fictions), is the following:  
Perhaps induction is far less important to the sciences than philosophers often 
believe? In other words the belief that science is derived from empirical foundations 
(induction) is nothing other than the advancement of empiricist misconceptions. Science 
works in a different way. Deduction, abduction and induction may all play roles along with 
various innate capacities relating to the know-how of the kind of animals we are.  
Two possibilities follow from this approach: 
1)  What we ‘know’ is by definition never fictional otherwise we simply do not 
know it.  
2)  Clear and distinct ideas and scientific concepts may be real e.g. possibly 
triangles, numbers, structures, quarks, atoms etc.   
Furthermore, our discoveries show a universe that is surprisingly uniform i.e. there is 
no demon ready to pull the carpet out from under us; there are only good and bad scientific 
14 
 
 
procedures.  I will call this the Rationalist Argument.
23
 I contend that 1 without fully 
accepting  2. Platonists and Realists often believe both 1 and 2. 
 If we consider the statement: What we ‘know’ is by definition never fictional 
otherwise we simply do not know it, I am not suggesting that every proposition is making an 
ontological commitment. For example, the statement “two wrongs do not make a right” is 
not clearly ontological, though it may seem true. 
Nonetheless, from the rationalist point of view, many of the famous critiques of the 
20
th
 century developed by Goodman, Quine and Morton White may only be attacks on 
empiricism. The indeterminacy of translation, the destruction of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction and the overall general attack on the ‘dualisms’ may have made behaviourism 
                                                          
23
 A few wild asides: 1) at the extremity of the rationalist argument is sometimes found the denial 
that this universe is the real Universe. There are some examples of this view e.g. Plato’s. I also 
attach this remark to Lewis’s many possible worlds as well as to Leibniz’s “monads in the best of 
all worlds” and to seemingly coherent nihilist cosmologies. Rationalists are sometimes committed 
to there being a heaven, either in the metaphorical Platonist sense (the place where the forms, 
concepts or structures reside) or in the real sense in which this universe is unfolding and folding 
back into itself i.e. eventually headed to perfection implying that all imperfect universe-versions are 
simply fictions. 2) Even parsimonious projects, like Chomsky’s, leave us wondering about where 
our languages suddenly came from. We live in a universe that is apparently and bizarrely capable of 
generating consciousness. 3) Whether or not an infinite multi-verse is the stuff of science-fiction 
remains to be shown; can it be shown at all? To augment the level of speculation: should this 
universe not be the real universe, then nothing here in this universe will have been proven; nor will 
it have been known, believed or lived. Should this universe dwindle into nothingness, who will 
remember our proofs, our lives and our beliefs? 4) Can unknown (i.e. mind-independent) universes 
exist? I mistrust the extremities of theories but noticing their tendency to lurk in the corners seems 
unavoidable. Simpler versions seem no less extravagant at their extremities.  
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and empiricism untenable,
24
 leaving a far more nativist option open.
25
 I will explore this a 
little more later. 
Despite the possibility that the rationalist argument can be made to favour assumption 
1, (science never employs fictions), there is still a great deal of support for the belief that it 
has been refuted. According to Suárez, examples abound: 
The modeling scholarship of the last decade or so has made a strong case for a 
version of Vaihinger’s main thesis: The use of fictions is as ubiquitous in scientific 
narratives and practice as in any other human endeavor, including literature and art; 
and scientists have demonstrated throughout history a capacity to create, develop, 
and use fictions for their own purposes that compares with that of any writers or 
artists.
26
  
At any rate, even if scientism and reductionism fail, must we necessarily adopt a fictionalist 
perspective? Let’s allow that assumption 1, i.e. science never employs fictions stands for the 
moment and work at the problem from another direction. 
2. Other Fictionalists. Bas van Fraassen, Roman Frigg, Ronald Giere, Hartry Field, 
Mauricio Suárez, Stephen Yablo, Mario Bunge and Nancy D. Cartwright are some 
examples of philosophers who also hold versions of fictionalism. It will be best, therefore, 
to assume there are many versions of fictionalism and so I will work at understanding 
Elgin/Goodman Fictionalism and consider others versions only when they prove helpful in 
understanding this one. A study of fictionalism in general commands a much larger work. I 
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 It should be noted that this history probably transformed Goodman and ultimately Elgin – both 
became constructivists. This is not an unlikely move. It is not far away from the move Kant made 
following Hume. 
 
25
 Even Empiricists and Behaviourists concede that we must have certain innate capacities in the 
form of know-how. The questions that puzzle Noam Chomsky are very fascinating: How is it 
possible that we can acquire a language? We must be hard-wired in some very powerful way. 
What this includes or doesn’t include is difficult ascertain.  
26
 Suárez, M. (2009) “Scientific Fictions as Rules of Inference”, p. 159. 
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do nonetheless believe the notion often relies on a category mistake as I have suggested 
above. 
When we speak of things that do not exist then generally we might be tempted to 
denote such things using the term ‘fictions’. This is one primary troubling ontological 
problem that would be difficult to avoid. For example, we might wonder, as others have, 
whether numbers exist? Continuing with this example, mathematical fictionalists 
(nominalists regarding mathematical entites) like Yablo and Bunge deny that numbers 
exist, while mathematical Platonists believe numbers do indeed exist. If numbers do not 
exist then the statement “2 is an even number” is false in the way that all talk of any fiction 
is false. At the very least it is not as obviously literally true that “2 is an even number” is 
true in the way that “Henry the 8th was the King of England” is literally true.27 This notion 
of literal truth is important to Elgin and it returns frequently. Literal truth for Goodman 
and Elgin is world dependent. One’s immediate reaction might be that the boundaries of 
what counts as literal truth are fuzzy at best. Some might retort impatiently, “Of course, 
2+2=4 is literally true!”  and “How can you not be certain that there is chalk on the table?” 
I admit to having been harshly chastised for being uncertain about either proposition in two 
separate philosophy classes. I guess it is possible that the list of things requiring the 
“certainty stamp” got lost in the mail and thus, never reached my apartment. Possibly, I am 
too puzzled by everything. For the moment, we will assume that literal truth is easy to 
understand and move forward. We will return to it in the section specifically devoted to 
epistemological concerns. 
A first intuition regarding mathematical fictionalism, might be that if truth is 
connected to existence, then true/false is made vacuous where mathematics is concerned. In 
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 See Balaguer, M. (2011) “Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics”, Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/#EmbPro  
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other words, can it be argued that the epistemological distinction between truth and 
falsehood need not necessarily be tied to ontology? Allowing that we probably need both 
words (true and false) to help us distinguish “2 is an even number” from “2 is an odd 
number” – can we just avoid the ontological problem altogether?28 This is, more or less, the 
move made by the logical positivists. I will argue from an irrealist perspective that 
mathematical numbers exist in a form-of-‘is’. My difficulties recounted above regarding 
recognizing “chalk” on a table came from the lack of agreement between my professor and 
I regarding which is-form
29
 we were selecting; not to mention my wondering whether he 
had painted a piece of wooden dowel and is a practicing illusionist in his spare time. My 
epistemologically internalist tendencies made me want to look for justification from a 
chemist and my Chomskyan internalist tendencies made me think I could name a pet white 
mouse “chalk”. So, for example, “Is chalk on the table from a quantum mechanical 
perspective?”30 can be answered with, I do not understand how chalk is relevant to 
Quantum mechanics and neither is that white cylindrical object my pet mouse. At any rate, 
we will call mathematical irrealism
31
 the view that numbers exist in the way that things like 
numbers exist and the same can be said for things like chalk and mice. This view may 
already have another name. By the end of this paper I will explain how things like gods, 
goblins and ghosts exist. 
The logical positivists undertook [this] admirable task. [O]nly two sorts of claims 
were considered cognitively significant: those whose truth values are entirely 
determined by their logical form and those whose truth values can be established by 
                                                          
28
 Another possible option is to reject the true/false bivalence and to supply another vocabulary e.g. 
assert versus deny. It leads to other problems. 
29
 I will define this in detail later. 
30
 I am not a Nihilist. Unfortunately, nihilism is not clearly incoherent and therefore belongs in the 
domain of the soon to be described is-puzzles. 
31
 This view may already have a name. 
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empirical evidence. The former belong to logic or mathematics, the latter to 
empirical science.
32
 
For the first expression “2 is an even number” we might simply use the word “true”, 
while for the second word, “false”. In short, we give up on ontological questions because 
they are nonsensical and thus preserve our much needed epistemology.  
However, and conversely, separating the ontological from the epistemological is hard 
to do when we attempt to unpack the notion of ‘fiction’. We may want it both ways and this 
generates our dilemma. Elgin avoids the extremes of the positivist tradition in an effort to 
preserve the notion of fiction. To my knowledge she does not, unlike Yablo, state clearly 
that numbers are fictions.
33
  Yablo gives wonderful examples like the following: “The 
number of numbers is 0”; “there are no prime numbers” and “the average mother has 2.3 
children and no mother has 2.3 children”.  
Completely denying the existence of numbers is somewhat extreme. One approach is 
to make them abstract objects. This is simply to place them in an is-form.  I will discuss 
this in the section on is-puzzles. Briefly, an is-puzzle is comprehensibly murky. 
Now, some is-puzzles I will argue (1, 2 and 3 below) are cognitively viral.
34
 The 
following list, I contend, is a list of is-puzzle-generators: 
1)  Self-contradiction.  
2)  Categorical errors. 
3)  Hidden internal inconsistencies.  
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 Elgin, C. Z. (1997) Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary, p.1-2. 
33
 Yablo , S. (2001) “Go Figure, a Path through Fictionalism”  p. 72-102. 
 
34
 This is from another paper I wrote on epistemology entitled “Belief Radicalism and Cognitive 
Viruses”. 
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4) Other is-puzzles are on the outside of our present scientific and other forms of   
understandings. An example might be a black hole or the end of the universe.  
This is fairly close to Vaihinger’s project in one respect. He viewed what I am calling 
is-puzzle-generators 1, 2 and 3 as “full fictions” and 4 as “semi-fictions”. However, he 
rejects assumption 1, no understanding can be gleaned from fiction. whereas I accept it. In 
fictions (the genre) we find play and disorder. There is a playful quality in Yablo’s curious 
statements above. I find paradoxes intriguing because they need to be thought of in a 
particular way such that we see the contradiction. Sometimes they are difficult to see.  
Understandings, I intend to argue, are derived from something other than fiction.  I, unlike 
Vaihinger, am suggesting full fictions are by definition syntactically and semantically 
empty. Contradictions, therefore, are not fully fictional. They exist in the way that things 
like contradictions exist. Fiction (the concept) on the other hand exists in the way that 
things like... well, nothing exists. I will call these is-puzzles (there are many) because we 
sometimes find ourselves wondering about strange things like the sentence nothing is. 
It is interesting to note that according to Suárez the positivists distanced themselves 
from Vaihinger. Obviously they were not fond of the notion that science relied on fictions 
and if it did, this would generally entail poor scientific practice. But, it is clear that 
Vaihinger believed that science relied on fictions: 
 [There] are […] fictions that figure in the scientific enterprise, and among the most 
prominent throughout the history of science Vaihinger identified forces, 
electromagnetic “lines” of force, the atom, and the mathematical infinity, as well as 
some of the main constructs of differential analysis such as infinitesimal, point, line, 
surface, and space.
35
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I believe the positivists simply made the wrong move. They abandoned all talk of 
fiction by suggesting it was nonsense, thereby trying to ground science and mathematics on 
non-fiction. An impossible project based upon an excellent intuition. Talk of pure fiction is 
talk of nothing. The positivist diagnosis was excellent however the treatment killed the 
patient. 
What then is the use of the word ‘fiction’? If we only have partial versions of the 
world we depict or represent, then can we ever insist on perfectly true versions? Do we 
often or always pass through fiction to find truth as Elgin and Goodman seem to claim? 
There are many other more contemporary philosophers who see no place for fiction 
anywhere. Continuing in the positivist footprints in many respects, they claim ‘fiction’ is 
simply meaningless. Examples of philosophers who have taken this approach include 
Donald Davidson and Quine. Once fictions are identified, these philosophers would prefer 
they be eliminated. We can call this approach, Eliminativist regarding fictions. Their 
scientism is apparent because they make fiction (the genre) unworthy of our respect.  
3. Pre-philosophy. The pre-philosophic intuition we may sometimes have or have 
heard is that art deals with fuzzy half-truths and subjective ideas while the sciences are 
objective and based entirely on truth. But, if we seek objectivity, then we might want to 
take a closer look. The line between art and science is not as obviously hard-edged as pre-
philosophers might think and we will deal with counter-arguments and some very 
problematic examples from both Goodman and Elgin. 
4. Diverse Topics. The rich fabric of individual threads I refer to above requires that 
we discuss a few diverse topics which tie to Elgin/Goodman fictionalism. For example, 
there might be problems of representation in the arts and sciences.  If so, these lead to some 
necessary work on denotation, reference, meaning, structures and other topics normally 
found in the philosophy of language. There are also epistemological questions about how 
representations and depictions are said to “fit” their targets.  
21 
 
 
Models are representations of a sort. Where models are concerned, we might want to 
consider if all abstract models are fictions? Are some models more fictional than others? 
What makes a model good? Or useful? How are models and agents related? Can models 
ever be true or false? 
There are problems that relate to the general epistemological problem which can be 
expressed in the following way: there seems to be a difference between our pictures of the 
world and the world. A version of the epistemological problem is addressed by John R. 
Searle. He asks, “How does language relate to reality”?36 A similar question for philosophy 
of science is “How do explanations relate to reality?” We can also ask: how do 
representations (and models) relate to targets and how do artistic depictions relate to their 
targets?  
Still, we may be inclined to believe there is a difference between our languages, 
pictures, models on the one hand and reality on the other, because we sometimes make 
mistakes. Again, I ask, is there a road that passes through fiction to bring us to 
understandings or to truth? Is it the same road? 
What do we know then? Reality or a version of it? Does all knowing entail knowing a 
version? Goodman, who described his fictionalism as irrealist
37
 accepted this latter 
entailment. Elgin’s view is somewhat similar.  
Goodman’s criticisms of comprehensiveness manifest his skepticism about 
physicalism. Although he recognizes the success of science in discovering many 
truths about many things, he does not believe that science can discover all truths. 
Nor does he believe that all accurate takes on things are articulable as truths. His 
criticism of uniqueness manifests a deeper skepticism. He denies that there is 
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37
 Goodman, N. (1978) Ways of Worldmaking, p. x. 
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exactly one way the world is. Rather, he suggests, there are many ways the world 
is.
38
  
 
To rephrase one element of the problem we could ask, in what sense is a flower itself 
‘true’? There may be no necessary connection between the ontology of a flower and true 
statements about it. 
We may notice that the phrase “there are many ways the worlds is” in the quote 
above,  is connected conceptually to my statement, there are very many is-forms.
39
 In other 
words, things exist in the very many forms-of-is. Similarly, things may be true in the very 
many forms-of-is, if they are ever true. I, therefore, present the hinge argument. This 
argument is the backbone of the position I am advocating. 
5. The Hinge Argument. So to outline the problem: 
To deal with statements of the form “Jimi was on fire” we need to do one of the 
following 3 options:
40
   
1) Treat the proposition as though it must only express truth i.e. the way that 
positivists would — make the meaning and truth depend upon being. 
2) Treat the proposition as either literally true or metaphorically true — make 
meaning depend upon a kind of truth. 
3) Treat the proposition as though it is categorically dense (conceptually structured) 
and meaningful under certain interpretations but not others — make meaning 
depend upon the sentence structure.  
 
The problem with 1 is it generates an unwarranted rigidity – there are far too many 
subtleties in our natural language. This is the kind of move made in philosophy of language 
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by Davidson, Putnam, Quine, David Lewis. We can call this approach to meaning 
epistemologism regarding meaning. 
The problem with 2 is it generates an enormous number of kinds of truth; 
metaphorical; literal; religious; scientific, yours, mine. We can call this view relativism 
regarding meaning. 
Finally, 3 makes the meaning of the proposition depend not on forms of being – real, 
less real, fictional, semi-fictional, nor on forms of truth but on categories i.e. is-forms or is-
functions and the rules of symbolic structures. Truth is subjected to the categories. 
This is not a coherence theory of truth. However, it is a coherence theory for sentence 
structure and therefore a theory of understanding. This demotes truth and being to the 
categories of understanding. More on this later.   
6. Themes: Elgin and Goodman. Elgin has made significant contributions to the 
recent work being done on artistic and scientific representation. Her article “Keeping 
Things in Perspective” is a good example and “Telling Instances” was included in the 
recently published collection Beyond Mimesis and Convention, representation in art and 
science.
41
 
Strongly connected to Elgin’s work on artistic and scientific representation is her 
overall approach to epistemology. I will begin with a brief presentation of a number of her 
most striking themes, first on fictions and then I will focus more directly on her 
epistemology.  
7. Mirrors, Imitation and Copying the World. Does science mirror nature and 
does art imitate life? Elgin provides many examples which show these clichés create 
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mysteries out of very valuable scientific and artistic practices. What are we to say of 
“sketches, caricatures, scientific models, and representations with fictitious subjects”? 42 
How are we to handle simplifications, distortions and exaggerations? In most respects the 
model or the representation simply fails to match the target or referent. And in many other 
“telling instances”43 there simply is no target to match—in artistic-fictions specifically—
there is generally no referent.  
Consider the well-worn question, how can a picture of Pegasus be a picture of a 
winged horse when there are no winged horses named Pegasus? I will refer to this as the 
no-target-problem. Here is another famous example: while 19
th
 Century London existed 
Sherlock Holmes did not. Baker Street was and is a street in London made famous for its 
connection to the Holmes who lived at the fictional address 221B. The problem is at the 
heart of mathematical fictionalism also. Recall, if numbers do not exist, then ‘2’ has no 
referent. Is talk of ‘2’ like talk of Pegasus and 221B Baker Street? 
Furthermore, Elgin notes, we can use very different and “incongruous 
representations” for the same target when one does indeed exist. A stick drawing of 
Secretariat is still a representation of a horse. The same goes for a marble sculpture of a 
Secretariat. We will call this the incongruous-representation-problem. 
The no-target-problem and the incongruous-representation-problem both fuel our 
intuitions that assumption 1 (science never employ fictions) is wrong. They show we are not 
mirroring anything real but rather than we are picturing the world according to our own 
perspectives. On the face of it our intuition supports the notion that curves which are 
smoothed are not literally true and ideal gases are fictions of the imagination.  
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The no-target-problem and the incongruous-representation-problem are not mutually 
exclusive either. We can have incongruous representations of non-targets e.g. many 
differing Pegasus-pictures. 
There are versions of real things as well as non-existent things. We can admit that 
there is a conceptual difference between, say, horses and winged-horses. Most of us have 
seen horses while most of us have never seen winged-horses. There are versions of horses 
represented in painting or photography and we probably have different mental images or 
imaginary versions of horses. What exactly are we mirroring with such a diversity of 
versions? 
Elgin continues with a description of the world out there in a theme which is central 
to this paper and which also plays an important role in the works of Goodman. Recall the 
questions: “does science mirror nature and does art imitate life?”  Elgin argues that copying 
reality would amount to replicating what William James called “the blooming buzzing 
confusion that confronts us”.44 Confusion however is not our goal. We aim at “making 
sense” of the world around us—to “structure, synthesize, organize, and orient ourselves”45 
with purpose in mind.  
We aim to understand. There are Kantian overtones visible here — “Intuitions 
without concepts are blind, concepts without intuitions are empty”.46 We can also associate 
the view with Sellars’  “Myth of the Given”.47 Lastly and most importantly, Elgin was 
highly influenced by her long time friend and colleague Goodman, who wrote in 
Languages of Art, “the Kantian dictum echoes here: the innocent eye is blind and the virgin 
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mind empty”.48  Goodman also credits Virginia Woolf with having said: “Art is not a copy 
of the real world. One of the damn things is enough”.49 As Elgin puts it: 
Goodman argues, however, that we are not passive recipients of sensory inputs. 
From the outset we actively engage in imposing order on things […]. We dissect 
experience to arrive at basic elements […].50  
 
Goodman tackles imitation as follows: 
‘To make a faithful picture, come as close as possible to copying the object just as it 
is.’ This simple-minded injunction baffles me; for the object before me is a man, a 
swarm of atoms, a complex of cell, the fiddler, a friend, a fool, and much more. If 
none of these constitute the object as it is, what else might? If all are ways the object 
is, then none is the way the object is. I cannot copy all these at once; and the more 
nearly I succeeded, the less would the result be a realistic picture. What I am to copy 
then, it seems, is one such aspect, one of the ways the object is or looks. But not, of 
course, any one of these at random […] The catch here, as Ernst Gombrich insists, is 
that there is no innocent eye.
51
 
To the extent that all these ‘ways of seeing’ are useful or true, how do we decide 
which is fictional? Again are they all fictional in some sense? 
8. The Problem of “Being” and Is-forms. I unfortunately need to make another 
excursion based on the neologism I am proposing: the is-form. I will suggest a simple 
device implying that: ‘is’ is a slippery little word, by proposing we reread Goodman’s 
statement above focusing on his striking use of the word ‘is’ as it ties contextually to is-
forms or (isf); specifically our problem can be reformulated in the way that the word ‘is’ 
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creates categories or concepts or more specific to Elgin and Goodman, worlds. Is-forms are 
not categories of being necessarily. They are categories of the understanding. However, I 
am not suggesting that Goodman meant to say is-form when he was using the notion of 
world or that ‘world’ really means ‘category’.  
I am going to justify the use of this device (isf) based on a number of points that 
Elgin makes in the following passage: 
Thus physics restructures its domain when it rejects the classical concept of mass in 
favor of a pair of concepts, rest mass and relativistic mass. Things that had been 
considered alike under the old categories are now deemed to be different. 
Paleontology advances when it classifies brontosauruses and apatosauruses as the 
same kind of animal. Things that had been deemed to be different come to be 
recognized as the same. Medicine progresses when it elevates shared characteristics 
of the sufferers of a disease to the status of symptoms. Aspects that had been 
deemed to be irrelevant come to be recognized as relevant. Statistics advances when 
it develops novel techniques. New methods enable us to glean new information 
from old data. None of these cases involves discovery of new facts. All improve the 
ways we think about or operate on the information at hand. Cognitive advancement 
often consists in reconfiguration—in reorganizing a domain so that hitherto 
overlooked or underemphasized features, patterns, opportunities, and resources 
come to light.” 52  
We use categorical structures and concepts
53
, in part, for the selection of particular is-
forms.  An isf creates the conditions by which certain expressions can be comprehensible.  
The isf is expressed as an is of x.
54
 We can therefore read “is-of” when confronted by 
isf. Here are some examples— note they are not necessarily dualisms:  
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 I link these objects: categories, concepts and worlds loosely to the show that: ‘Is’ is a slippery 
word which we use primarily to select a categorical scheme, concept or world. This will tie together 
as I proceed. 
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Jones (actor) is Agent K (character) = isf fiction/non-fiction 
Jones is a Homo sapiens = isf biology/classificatory/natural scientific object 
Jones is not the man he used to be = isf numerical identity/qualitative identity 
Jones is buried in London's Highgate cemetary = isf living/non-living 
Jones is a complete animal = isf metaphor 
London is being moved = isf  abstract/concrete 
I will return momentarily to the thread of Elgin/Goodman-fictionalism but I will first 
attempt to further explicate this point. The following passage is from Ways of Worldmaking 
in the section entitled “A Puzzle about Perception”.  
1. Seeing beyond Being.  Once in awhile, someone asks me rather petulantly 
“Can’t you see what’s before you?” Well, yes and no. I see people, chairs, papers, 
and books that are before me, and also colors, shapes and patterns that are before 
me. But do I see the molecules, electrons, and infrared light that are also before me? 
And do I see the state, or the United States, or the universe? I see only parts of the 
latter comprehensive entities, indeed, but then I also see only parts of the people, 
chairs, etc. And if I see a book and it is a mess of molecules, then do I not see a 
mess of molecules.
 55
 
We can look at some of Goodman’s observations by using examples with the word 
‘is’. Here are a few sentences expressing certain similar thoughts that he mentioned above: 
a) What I see is a person. 
b) What I see is a chair. 
c) What I see is a mess of molecules. 
d) What I see is the universe. 
e) What I see is the United States. 
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Besides my reflection that Goodman would not support my epistemology teacher’s 
demand that I be certain regarding chalk, I think we may note the following. Since we are 
using the word ‘is’, we can argue that there is a relationship in these examples to the 
concept ‘being’, or if one prefers, that we are making an ontological commitment of some 
sort by saying something ‘is’. It’s not hard to see that the examples above differ 
ontologically. They can only be understood if we allow that they imply differing ways of 
categorizing being, as Goodman suggests in the title. Sentences a) and b) are part of the isf 
common sense or the isf macro-level objects or even the isf literal truth. Sentences c) and d) 
are part of the isf natural sciences and e) is part of the isf political organization. 
Possible categorizations are unlimited. This seems to be a consequence of Goodman’s 
views, but, I would like to suggest it simply results from the apparent fact that we can 
create infinite possibilities from finite rules
56
. Everything is, in some way the same and in 
way different. 
The primary argument can now be rephrased as follows: Using ‘fiction’ as though it 
is a noun implies the isf genre not the isf concept. We cannot simply conflate these two 
forms without finding ourselves in a verbal dispute. 
9. The Domain of Is-puzzles.  For the moment I will suggest we create a special 
domain for problematic puzzles. Call the domain: the domain of is-puzzles or (isp). 
Consider: 
a) The universe is made of mind. 
b) The universe is made of matter which is independent of mind. 
c) The universe is made of energy. 
d) The universe is made of God. 
e) The number of numbers is 0. 
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Add to this two fascinating ontological observations made by Quine:  
 
A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three 
Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘What is there?’ It can be answered, moreover, in a 
word—‘Everything’—and everyone will accept this answer as true. However, this is 
merely to say that there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over 
cases; and so the issue has stayed alive down the centuries.
 57
  
 
The second is the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument. It can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories. 
(P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories. 
(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
 58
 
 
 
Quine’s first statement is fascinating because it draws our attention to the problem of 
categorization. Essentially there is an isf for everything and in every possible dissection. At 
first this seems to imply a reductio ad infinitum. We will call this the too-many-categories 
problem. It is not a real problem, or rather it is only as problematic as there being an 
everything in the first place.  (P1) cuts the categorization down to the objects that science 
needs. This is an excellent re-definition of scientism by the way. Curiously, and 
humorously we may note that the argument rides upon the isf ought. Ought is in some 
sense. Even Putnam and Quine used it in their indispensability argument i.e. that seems to 
make ought indispensible to the argument. Give to science what it needs because well, it 
seems like the right thing to do. This is why an example of why positivism failed and 
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metaphysics was reborn in the analytic tradition. Metaphysics is dead… Long live 
metaphysics. 
Isf ought may be an is-puzzle but there are definitely far more problematic ones. For 
example, the isf nothing, the isf art objects, ideal gases, perfect vacuums (as opposed to 
partial vacuums) and holes.  
10. The Kantian Problem Versus the No Target Problem.We should, I believe, 
distinguish the no target problem from what I am going to call the Kantian problem.
59
 The 
Kantian problem implies, as stated above, that there is no given; there is no non-
perspectival view; no God’s eye view for humans (at least); no innocent eye free of human 
interests. Let’s allow for the sake of argument that we can either posit a mind-independent-
world or not and that it makes no difference either way to what really counts i.e. what we 
know. We can call it the isf objective reality. 
The Kantian problem can be an extreme interpretation of the no target problem. In 
essence, it can be interpreted to imply that all targets we know are targets we have made. 
While this might very well be the case, we nevertheless need to draw a distinction between 
things like Pegasus and things like Secretariat.
60
 However, in the mean time we can see 
that the Kantian problem must nonetheless lead us to a distinction between representations 
of Secretariat as well as representations of Pegasus. Neither of the two fully exists 
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32 
 
 
independently of mind if they are things we know. Fair enough, we may concede this point. 
But, the no target problem deals with representations like Pegasus in particular. Pegasus is 
‘stuck in our heads’ in a way that Secretariat is not. The likelihood of there being an 
enormous conspiracy to hide the winged-skeleton of Pegasus while forging the footage of 
the Triple Crown is nil. Philosophers who overemphasize the Kantian problem have no way 
of distinguishing between things like Secretariat and things like Pegasus. Understanding 
‘understanding’ probably requires we distinguish between the Kantian problem and the no 
target problem. All the subtle variations of realism and idealism are attached to this story in 
some way. I would suggest here that is an is-puzzle (isp) at work. I will not detail it other 
than to say, that at its extreme, the Kantian-problem converts everything to the no-target-
problem. This is, arguably, the nihilism that generated many of Kant’s more extravagant 
descendents.  
The is-form (isf), involved, is the “is of nothingness” and we will put it in the domain 
of is-puzzles (isp) for obvious reasons. Note however, that we can, if we wish, distinguish 
Secretariat from Pegasus by attaching both to a large number of classes. The isf we have 
been considering as the topic of this thesis is the isf fiction versus non-fiction. But, we can 
also categorize in other ways. For instance, the isf horses versus non-horses; the isf famous 
horses versus unknown horses; the isf hoofed mammals versus non-hoofed mammals.  
Socrates, we may notice, and Secretariat can both be categorized by the isf wingless 
versus winged and by featherless versus feathered while both Socrates and Pegasus by the 
isf Greek history versus non-Greek history. 
Ultimately, as I mentioned above, there is no too-many-categories problem because 
categories are at the core of our capacity for understanding. Nonetheless, not all 
categorizations are created equal. 
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Is there no way the world is? Is the thing-in-itself, itself a fiction? Even Kant seems 
to have been unable to make up his mind. An instrumentalist fictionalist might claim: even 
if there is nothing in itself, perhaps we need to assume the existence of such a thing. The 
thing-in-itself must exist in some isf, at least to the extent that it generates an isp. The same 
can be said of other minds also. We will, therefore, also place the problem of philosophical 
zombies into our domain of isp. Rejecting the thing-in-itself seems to push us toward 
solipsism. It seems we need the category isf internal/external as well as 
subjective/objective. The world may turn out to be made of mind but if it is, it is likely not 
made of my mind alone. 
11. Understandings. We will, therefore, need to define ‘understanding’ as 
something ‘we’ do. Concentrating on fictional representations, perhaps we can obtain some 
insights about understanding.  
To Elgin, mirroring the real entails mirroring what William James called the 
‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ out there. Elgin turns the tables on the problem by stating: 
[S]ince understanding is not mirroring, failures of mirroring need not be failures of 
understanding. Once we recognize the way science affords understanding, we see 
that the features that look like flaws under the mirroring account are actually 
virtues.
 61
  
Not everyone is going to agree with Elgin on this idea. Staunchly realist philosophers 
will likely say we simply have not understood enough. Complete understanding implies 
understanding everything and therefore perfectly mirroring the mind-independent-world. 
What we leave unexplained is a sign of our failure to understand perfectly. Elgin is 
sympathetic to both instrumentalists, who consider the project as it stands now, arguing 
scientists are tool-makers, though they may be understanding something, and she is also 
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sympathetic to realists. She states, “[o]r one can take a realist stance and say that the 
phenomena are a product of signal and noise, and that the models just eliminate the 
noise.
62” One might notice, that instrumentalism is not necessarily incompatible with 
weakened versions of scientific realism i.e. the view that there is a mind-independent-world 
that we can know through the sciences, even if only by approximation. Instrumentalists 
often see fictions as necessary tools in the advancement of science. Elgin, however, is 
clearly anti-eliminativist regarding fictions. 
12. The Primitive Hierarchy Problem. It’s difficult to create a hierarchy of 
concepts or categories. How do we decide which is the more primitive? Some may argue 
that it makes no difference; all roads lead to Rome. For example, are the differences 
between the sciences and the arts more primitive than the concepts of denotation and 
representation or is it just the opposite? We can see in what follows that for both Elgin and 
Goodman, the latter appears true. Both the sciences and the arts, they argue, can be ways 
we represent the world. Representation becomes the primary foundation for both authors.  
Recall our pre-philosophical view that the arts are fuzzy and subjective while the 
sciences rest on true and solid foundations—never fictions—after all science is founded on 
fact. 
But, perhaps as Elgin points out, there are many examples of fictions regularly used 
by scientists. For example, are there frictionless planes, ideal gasses, smoothed curves and 
perfectly pure liquids? How about strange mathematical entities like Pi and Aleph null? We 
use Pi all the time but it’s an uncompleted number? Why should we use Pi before it is 
perfectly calculated? Can it ever be perfectly calculated? These are serious 
counterexamples to assumption 1 (that science never relies on fictions for gleaning 
understandings). The early positivists would claim the point is moot—there are simply no 
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metaphysical concerns—existence questions are non-problems. But, how would the 
positivists handle approximations, infinities, Pi, smoothed curves and frictionless planes? 
These are epistemological riddles, not metaphysical ones, or so they would argue. Strictly 
speaking these things are false, yet they are used by scientists all the time. And if they are 
false, should we not be calling them fictional? After all, they are representations of non-
targets. It is one thing to be hard-headedly-eliminativist regarding fictions in the arts and 
another to eliminate Pi. 
Suárez offers other examples including the “ether”, and the “plum pudding model of 
the atom”: 
Maxwell remained resolutely skeptical regarding the existence of the ether. The 
mechanical models of the ether were gradually stripped of ontological content as the 
dynamical equations were developed, yet these mechanical models remained 
indispensable to scientific theorizing, according to Maxwell, “as heuristic devices, 
or at best, descriptions of what nature might be like” (Morrison, 2001).63  
 
The case of atomic models illustrates another possibility: a model of a putatively 
real entity that was never taken very seriously”. 64 
 
According to the plum pudding model, the atom is a roughly spherical sponge 
formed by evenly distributed positive charge in which minute negatively charged 
particles (“electrons”) are inserted, like raisins in a traditional British Christmas 
cake. The model had the great advantage of explaining ionization phenomena, 
whereby negative charged particles are bounced off atoms by collisions with other 
atoms, creating electric currents.
 65
 
 
It would seem obvious that the notion that a model has raisins does not imply that all 
the features of raisins and cake are explanatory. If interesting calculations resulted from the 
treatment of the atom as a cake, this would seem problematic for those who support 
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assumption 1. These are more like historical facts. We may wish to change our negative 
assumption to a positive hypothesis in search of plenty of evidence: 
Hypothesis 1: There is plenty of evidence supporting the view that scientists use 
fictions ubiquitously. 
We can call the view that these are only examples of past failures, the argument from 
failed science. Unfortunately, this argument is of little help until science is actually 
completed, something that may be impossible. Elgin, Goodman and Suárez supply ample 
evidence showing that scientists use metaphors of this kind as much now as they ever have.  
Models of stellar structure in astrophysics provide a description of the inner 
workings of a star; in particular the fuel burning processes (nuclear fusion) that turn 
hydrogen into helium and generate the star radiation, while accounting for the star 
life cycle and evolution. These models match up the observational quantities of a 
star, which mainly pertain to the properties of its photosphere, that is, the outermost 
layer of the star. [...] These models make at least four assumptions that are widely 
assumed to contradict either the physics of matter and radiation, the physical 
conditions of the interstellar medium, or both. Hence the models are knowingly 
strictly speaking false of real stars.
66
 
 
And...  
 
the quantum theory of measurement fails to describe real quantum measurements, 
and the model expresses a fiction—to be exact, a semi-fiction in the terminology of 
Vaihinger, because it contradicts empirical reality.
67
 
 
Vaihinger distinguished between fictions i.e. necessarily false and semi-fictions i.e. 
empirically false. The point is that theories would deflate by virtue of incoherence. 
 
In Vaihinger’s terminology, the quantum theoretical model of measurements 
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is a fully fledged scientific fiction.
68
 
 
Suárez, distinguishes fictions in the arts from fictions in the sciences based on 
Vaihinger’s notion of “expediency”.  Granted, artistic fictions do not appear in a hurry. The 
distinction for Suárez is cognitive; Scientists do not ‘make-believe’ in the way that we do 
when confronted with artistic-fictions.  This may be a superficial distinction. However, the 
main point Vaihinger makes is that inferences in scientific-fictions are aimed at 
“prediction”.69 Suárez calls his thesis: the inferential conception of scientific representation. 
It opposes two other versions: 1) the isomorphic conception and 2) the similarity 
conception.  
Those who hold either the isomorphic conception or the similarity conception have 
problems overcoming the no-target-problem. For example, if there is no ether then what 
exactly is the structure that includes ether actually representing? 
According to the isomorphism account, A can only represent B if they share their 
structure. But in the case of fictional representation this is either false or an empty 
truism, for it seems impossible to ascribe structure to a nonexistent entity. If the 
ether does not exist it can not possess any real structure, so isomorphism can not 
obtain.
70
 
 
[According to the] similarity account [...], A represents B if and only if A and B are 
similar. Then if similarity requires the sharing of actual properties between A and B, 
there can be no “fictional” representation in science because B lacks any real 
properties. We cannot represent the ether by means of models that share actual 
properties with the ether if there is no ether.
 71
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It is interesting to note that Elgin/Goodman fictionalism and Suárez’s Vaihinger-
influenced inferential fictionalism do not make the kind of ontological commitment that 
both the isomorphism account and the similarity account ultimately must make. All aspects 
of theory making remain in our heads. Theory making is a cognitive activity after all. 
Theories are “brain-children” or “artefacts”. 
Nonetheless, fictionalism is not clearly incompatible with making an ontological 
commitment to a mind-independent world, as most scientists do. It should be noted that 
while there is no way the world is to Elgin/Goodman fictionalists, there are indeed ways 
that worlds are. In effect, pluralism does a reasonable job dealing with fiction and non-
fiction by attaching the concepts to worlds. 
Bunge’s fictionalism is different. Jean-Pierre Marquis explains that Bunge maintains 
the view that mathematical entities are fictions and can be categorized in a class of things 
that includes “Donald Duck” and “Don Quixote”.72 Furthermore, they are unchanging, 
immutable; they lack energy, they are conceivable and context dependent. Material objects, 
on the other hand, have energy, their existence is absolute and mutable. We can argue that 
as an emergentist materialist, Bunge emphasises the category isf: made by an animal brain 
versus made by an animal brain related to the real world, i.e. formal versus factual This 
makes concepts like mathematical structures and categories brain children and subject to 
the rule of reason, while it makes statements of fact subject to the study of the real world. 
We can see there is a similarity to Vaihinger’s philosophy of as if. We treat these 
mathematical entities as if they are real.  We, thus derive many new categories isf: 
conceptual entities versus real entities and mathematical entities versus spatio-temporal 
entities. This tends to beg the question. Are as-if’s really just worlds? Don’t nominalists tell 
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us we can categorize in any direction? But, maybe this is an error. Understanding is not 
simply the act of categorizing. Perhaps by ‘understanding’ we ultimately imply a chain of 
categories in a specific order. For example, some categories are far more local than others. 
In the section on the domain of isp I will hopefully quell some of my own misgivings about 
this problem. I suspect here that it will lead to old news. There is a vast literature on the 
role of locality in causal explanations in philosophy of science, for example. The idea that 
the Big bang caused the inkwell to fall is insufficiently local. And the same kind of point 
can be made about how God caused some of us to catch the measles and not others.  There 
is another isp lurking in this section: the isf causality. 
I would suggest that the above is what Bunge and Marquis have in mind by 
specifying the “essential distinction” in what follows: 
The essential distinction, as far as epistemology and the philosophy of science is 
concerned, is that between truths (or falsities) of reason and truths (or falsities) of 
fact. (Bunge, 1974, p. 170) 
 
Bunge later more or less pushed to the side the distinction between analytic and 
synthetic propositions. It is simply replaced by the distinction between formal and 
factual propositions. 
 
The preceding classification is more correct than either of the popular dichotomies 
analytic/synthetic or a priori/a posteriori. For one thing the concepts of analyticity 
and a prioriness have not been well defined except in extreme cases. Thus, a 
tautology is clearly analytic, but what about a theorem in theoretical physics, which 
has been derived by purely conceptual means? And an empirical datum is clearly a 
posteriori, but what about a factual hypothesis not built inductively and which 
happens to anticipate experience correctly? Neither of the two distinctions amounts 
to a dichotomy, hence neither is a sound principle of classification. (Bunge, 1983, p. 
181)
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There may be a hierarchy of concepts or categories related to specific examples of 
understanding. Now, we have factual versus formal. What is more surprising is that there 
may even be a hierarchy of is-puzzles (isp). 
 
13. Fictions, Features and Facets. If there is an important ‘joint’ in categories 
regarding fiction-kinds (artistic, scientific and other), it may lie elsewhere. I begin by 
outlining another possible criticism (the one I support) of Goodman/Elgin fictionalism. 
Let’s consider filmmaking for a moment. Presumably, documentaries need to be 
distinguished from fictions. I would like to suggest that we consider the possibility that 
there are fictions on the one hand and something I will call facets on the other. Both fictions 
(the genre) and facets can have features of the world. I use the word ‘facet’ because it 
invokes a connection to a target or referent that fiction does not. Note that facets are not the 
same as facts. 
I propose therefore, that we further distinguish between what I will call scientific-
facets as opposed to scientific-fictions and in parallel between artistic-facets and artistic-
fictions. A first attempt might be as follows: 
Definition 1: Scientific-facets and artistic-facets have a connection to the real world 
in a way that fictions do not.  
This may help us distinguish between science and pseudo-science and between 
representational art and purely sensual abstraction. The following are preliminary examples 
of scientific-facets and scientific-fictions: 
A) Phlogiston is a scientific-fiction. 
B) A frictionless plane is a scientific-facet. 
 
The following are examples of artistic-facets and artistic-fictions: 
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C) Warp drive (travelling through space at speeds many times faster than light) and 
a bronze sculpture of Pegasus are artistic-fictions. 
 D) Film footage of Secretariat and footage of the bomb that fell on Hiroshima are 
artistic-facets. 
 
At the core of this distinction is some kind of as yet undetermined connection. 
Phlogiston is disconnected, while frictionless planes are connected. I will not attempt to 
define this notion of ‘connection’ here but it strikes me that connection to the world results 
in things like explanations and predictions. This says nothing about whether 
representational art is in some sense better than sensual abstraction or whether documentary 
footage is better than warp drive. That would be like asking if work is better than play or if 
dreams that make no sense are just not worth having. 
Where artistic representations are concerned, we could notice that a bronze sculpture 
of Pegasus and documentary footage of Secretariat both feature elements of horses. 
Two problems with this approach come to mind:  
1) It requires that we properly separate the facets from the fictions in any context. 
This is easier said than done. The classic example for this idea is quantum 
mechanics. It is little wonder that Richard Feynman stated, “I think I can safely say 
that nobody understands quantum mechanics”. Distinguishing the mental machinery 
from the real is the problem. 
2) Thought experiments i.e. often fictional, seem to play a necessary role in the 
sciences and everywhere else. 
At any rate, with these preliminary distinctions in mind I return to a more detailed 
exposé of Elgin`s work. 
14. Representation and Denotation. Elgin notes that the word “representation” is 
polysemous. She attempts to regiment for the sake of explication by specifying that “all 
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representation is a matter of denotation”. Pictures, charts, models and maps represent any 
particular target by denoting the target.  
We should note that this position is a form of representationalism. This is another 
intriguing element in the debate. We note above, in the section on primitive hierarchies that 
representation and denotation are the foundation of Goodman and Elgin’s work. This places 
both authors in a particular tradition. They are descendents of phenomenalism, ultimately a 
branch of Empiricism. But, we can argue in a different direction. Perhaps there are things 
which are not representations. For example, structures. I re-introduce this notion here in 
passing and it will come back further on. We can call the idea that representations are not 
primitive: anti-representationalism regarding structures. 
We can return to the no target problem since we are currently attempting to 
understand how Elgin unpacks denotation and representation.
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1) One can insist that denotation of a target implies the existence of the target.   
2) One can allow that any target we denote need not exist (be fictional) or can exist 
abstractly. For example, accept that both a Sherlock Holmes-picture and the name 
Sherlock Holmes denote a fictional character.
75
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In pursuit of a resolution to the no target problem, Elgin follows Goodman by 
drawing a distinction between representations of p and p-representations. The distinction is 
a device which helps us separate cases where the target exists from cases where it does not 
exist. So a representation of p implies p exists or has existed whereas in the case of p-
representations the existence of p is not a necessary condition. We refer therefore to 
Pegasus-pictures and to ideal-gas-models without assuming winged-horses and ideal gasses 
must exist. We can refer to the death mask of Dante and a model of the Empire State 
Building because we accept that Dante did indeed exist and that the Empire State Building 
still does.
76
 
Notice that a p-representation and a representation of p work for any kind of 
representation. So, we should if we wish to adopt the device, state for example, this is an 
ideal gas-model and not this is a model of an ideal gas. 
We can see, however, that the device creates a class of things that includes both ideal 
gas-models as well as Pegasus-pictures. Perhaps, conflating these two very different things 
creates a substantial problem. Our categories have become crossed. Of course, we are free 
to categorize in any way we would like. The goal, however, is to limit confusion. Here is 
why: 
Let’s consider the possibility that the-representations-of-p-versus-p-representations-
distinction fails to encompass the notions of prediction, manipulation and explanations, 
which are dear to the sciences, whereas the distinction I suggested above between fictions 
and facets does. This is still only a preliminary attempt.  
Thus a Pegasus-picture is an artistic-fiction while the ideal gas-model is a scientific-
facet. The point is that there is a connection between ideal gas-models and the real world 
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that renders these kinds of models useful in a very specific way. That connection stems 
from an implicit feature of the model that is in the world. This tends to weaken the case for 
fictionalism. Perhaps it is not from fictions that we glean understandings—though fictions 
(the genre) can certainly be fun—rather maybe it is from facets alone, that understandings 
are derived. No doubt fictions (the genre) exemplify features of the world as do facets – 
however, let’s now further define ‘facet’ as a having (not representing) key features so 
ordered as to have explanatory power and predictive power. 
Definition 2: a fiction is a representation exemplifying one or more disorganized 
features. 
Definition 3: a facet exemplifies features organized in such a way as to render 
explanations, manipulations and predictions possible. A facet, therefore, can be 
metaphorically represented by a key – a key must be made in a particular way to 
open a lock. The hills and valleys on the shaft of the key, while they are features, 
are not sufficient in and of themselves. 
Continuing the exposé with the above in mind: Elgin further addresses the enduring 
philosophical puzzle (the no target problem) by discussing “genre”. Consider the example 
of Charles Schulz’s cartoon character Snoopy. Snoopy-pictures are simply part of the genre 
of cartoon pictures—they belong to a particular genre of representation. “Some 
representations denote their ostensible objects […] others fail to denote […] anything 
real”.77 Elgin argues that Snoopy-pictures really denote the genre while pictures of 
Abraham Lincoln denote Abraham Lincoln. 
Has Elgin only skirted the problem? If a genre can be denoted then why does 
‘existence’ include genres but not Snoopy?  
I may be misunderstanding both Goodman and Elgin. The notion of genre is actually 
hugely useful. They raise it and it seems to me (though I may have misunderstood their 
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reasoning) that they do not to fully take advantage of what it implies. When I speak of 
fiction I mean to speak of the genre which incorporates features. But, in fiction, features are 
incorporated in a particular and often playful way. One of Goodman’s salient points about 
art is that it always exemplifies. Features are always present. My point, however, is that 
when features are well organized they contribute to understanding. We learn from faceted 
features in fictional narratives. While the notion of genre is central to my work here, we 
may recall that Vaihinger distinguished semi-fictions from fictions. I, on the other hand, 
posit that fiction (the concept) represents the empty set and that all representations 
(scientific or artistic) are irreal and faceted by degree. 
Continuing again: In Goodmanian terms, and Elgin would likely agree, the notion of 
genre is part of the notion of what they mean by “world”. The snoopy-picture selects the 
genre in a world (cartoon arts) in which Snoopy exists. Snoopy therefore denotes a real 
thing (fictional target) in a fictional world and nothing in the common sense real world. In 
the world of possibilities, for example, Snoopy cannot come to life as a real dog. “Snoopy 
is a dog” is adjusted to “Snoopy is a cartoon dog”.  
We can see that the notion of worlds depends on categorical distinctions. It does not, 
however, imply strict and forceful joints.  
Bunge and Marquis draw a similar key categorical distinction to the one which I am 
presenting herein. The distinction runs perpendicularly (in the opposing direction) to the 
representations-of-p versus p-representations distinction. Rather than to categorize fictions 
versus non-fictions, Bunge and Marquis categorize brain-children versus real and 
mathematical-children whose truth is coherentist (reasonable and formal) versus scientific, 
where truth is factual. Essentially, Bunge and Marquis create a class, which contains many 
similar entities as does my approach. I contend, however,  that the Bungean approach will 
fail over the definition of the word ‘real’.  
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This may be because my impression is that epistemology has not yet provided a 
satisfactory explanation of knowledge. What is really real can always be Gettierized
78
 as is 
noted by Elgin. Externalists regarding Epistemology argue “it is possible to know that you 
know” – we need not have justifications. I begin to wonder about “cardboard cows” and 
“fake barns” and wooden chalk. This is the heart of the debate between the 
representationalist (constructivist) camp and the realist camp (Bunge). To Elgin, Goodman, 
Kant, everything is a construct or a brain-child. Do we perceive a star or a perspective of a 
star? Is a photograph of a star, the actual star? Does the photograph cause the star? All 
camps studied so far are idealist regarding brain children. The question we are asking is 
where to draw the line. Bunge is clear: at the line created by causality. Our photographs do 
not cause stars to be. We will leave this to the chapter on Elgin’s epistemology. 
15. Mathematics and the Problem of Identity. We return to the example of an 
epistemology professor who exclaimed, “Of course 2+2=4!” In International Journal of 
Mathematics
79
 one might find a fascinating article
80
 explaining that mathematicians world-
wide have agreed to replace the equal sign for another sign altogether. As it turns out the 
equals sign in 2+2=4 is not unlike Saul Kripke’s rule following paradox, (plus/quus) more 
like equals/quequals actually. Furthermore, in a less technical article we could read: 
Mathematicians, it appears have replaced the lowly ‘=’ sign, whether we like it or not. 
This hardly made the news. Nevertheless, it will take years before it becomes part of 
your child’s curriculum. Text-books are all to be rewritten based, as it turns out, on 
                                                          
78
 Gettier, E. (1963), “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” p. 121-123. 
 
79
The International Journal of Mathematics, vol. 22, n
o
. 10,  http://www.worldscinet.com/ijm/ 
consulted on 11/8/2011. 
80
 McDean, Elmer. “Mathematics and the Problem of Identity”. The International Journal of 
Mathematics, vol. 22, n
o
. 10  http://www.worldscinet.com/ijm/ consulted on 11/8/2011. 
47 
 
 
difficulties over identity and we will even require new calculators and keyboards no 
less.  It seems:  
a) 2+2=4 
is no longer meaningful. What are we supposed to say, according to mathematicians? 
2+2 is a model of 4. Short hand: 2
2 
models 4.The operator for representing modelling 
is:   
b)  2+2 4 
The rationale is simple. How can two things be equal to one another if they look so 
different? In the world in which we purchase apples with money, there is an arbitrary 
quality in the idea that four apples equal two dollars. This, unfortunately, won’t affect 
your pocket book.
 81
  
I admit, that I have often wondered why differences of position (to the left of and to 
the right of), typography, difference in symbol, did not disturb mathematicians. It turns out, 
this bothered many all along.  
The same kind of notion apparent applies to probability. Does probability model 
phenomena? We could model the flipping of 2 coins – for example, what are the chances of 
event A (heads) and event B (heads) occurring across two coin flips? We once wrote: 
 P(A∩B) = P(A)P(B) = ½ X ½= ¼ 
Now, we will write:  P (A∩B)  ¼ 
I must apologise to me reader at this point because the above is entirely fabricated. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be shown that this equals replacement scenario will not happen. It 
cannot be shown that Bunge’s modelling operator is not simply better than the equal sign 
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because it is actually more correct.
82
 However, I repeat my apology and assure that I will 
not attempt to mislead again. My efforts here are genuine and honest at best and at worst, 
simply, misguided. This experiment, I hope, will prove relevant at the end of this exercise 
in my discussion of agency. I will call it the white lie argument. 
We may notice that 1) what makes a lie work is the extent to which the features in the 
lie are organised such that the lie is said to be believable 2) what makes a lie, a lie, is that 
the connection to the world is ultimately disorganised. If we follow the footnotes above, we 
will arrive at a dead end. The lie simply cannot be regarded as fictional (the concept) 
because it would be without any facets whatsoever.  
We could therefore begin with how Chomsky puts it, “…we cannot assume that 
statements (let alone sentences) have truth conditions. At most, they have something more 
complex: ‘truth indications’…”.83 If we think of ourselves as scientific regarding our 
human predicament, there is a strong sense in which all questions begin from a neurological 
and biological starting point. And when at our best, I believe we proceed evidentially. 
Please note however that I accept that deductions are evidential and therefore I am not 
supporting empiricism.
84
 I am supporting the scientific method as well as warrant based 
belief epistemologies. 
The point of this experiment was to show that we are dependent on each domain for 
indications of how we are to proceed regarding what to believe. Mathematics, science, art 
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require different approaches.  Marquis describes how Bunge draws a hard categorical line 
in the following: 
Thus, in Bunge’s system, we have contextual existence predicates and therefore at 
least two different existence predicates: one for real existence and one for ideal 
existence. Here they are (Bunge, 1977, p. 157): 
 
Definition 6 
1. x exists conceptually =df For some set C of constructs, Ecx; 
2. x exists really =df For some set  of things, Ex. 
The astute reader will have observed that there are numerous existence predicates in 
fact, just as many as there are contexts of relevance. Thus Bunge introduces an 
existence predicate for the set M of characters in Greek mythology and an existence 
predicate EM for these. One wonders how these existence predicates arise and are 
related. One can say that the foregoing axioms tell us that the two predicates in 
definition 6 are certainly the most fundamental. Thus, every character in Greek 
mythology is certainly a construct. Notice that conceptual existence and real 
existence are mutually exclusive, i.e. an object cannot exist both conceptually and 
really. Thus, we have two parallel realms, so to speak. However, we know that the 
realm of conceptual existence depends upon the realm of real existence, via thinking 
brains. Thus, although concrete existence and real existence are mutually exclusive, 
the former depends upon the later for its being. The link between the two realms is 
left completely unspecified.
 85
 
 
The category which is primitive to Bunge is isf: real thing versus ideal construct. 
This, however, and for example, would seem to entail that pain and suffering are neither 
‘things’ nor ‘brain-children’. But, certainly they must be real. Defining the notion of the 
real is extraordinarily complex. Are peoples (groups of people) real for example? Saying 
only living individual persons are real could work toward creating just societies but then we 
have to deal with corporations which are clearly not real by Bunge’s definition. I have 
moved to the political sphere for a moment and will not continue here. Our solution, in my 
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view lies in the recognition that categorizations cannot be avoided; they are in our ability to 
communicate. This leads us to admit that all categorization are irreal and interconnected to 
some degree.   
We are beginning to see the vague possibility of this being a verbal dispute. If 
categories are not agreed upon beforehand we are involved in category mistakes. 
Inevitably, unless we speak in the same is-forms, we cannot understand one another. Both 
Bunge and Elgin might be bothered by this insinuation. However, they are clearly at odds 
on how to prioritize the ontological joints. It would seem to me that no sooner is an 
ontological joint drawn than some philosopher finds an exception. On bad days, we wonder 
how we will ever get anywhere. The facts remain clear, that these are burdens not for 
philosophy alone, but, for all domains. The way out to some extent is through philosophy. 
Another isp is at work: the isf ontological joints. More on this later. 
Elgin’s approach to the no target problem is to embrace it. What counts is not how we 
use the word ‘denotation’ but whether we can tell the difference between fiction and non-
fiction. This is what it seems Elgin uses the device to accomplish, while more or less 
avoiding the no target problem i.e. denotation of the non-existent. 
It is interesting that many of us can recognize the various Snoopy-versions, for 
example, Snoopy crying, dancing, laughing etc. We even recognize fairly poor Snoopy-
renderings as Snoopy-renderings. Early Snoopy-versions by Schulz are very different from 
later versions, as are versions by other cartoonists and amateurs. This is covered by Elgin, 
as we shall see, when she unpacks exemplification.  
I would like to propose and alternative ‘ism’ to fictionalism. Let’s call this 
alternative, Facet-ism.  
Definition 4: Facet-ism implies that all ‘understanding’ depends on a specific form 
of recognition and organization of features such that an adequate explanation, or 
manipulation or prediction is made possible.  
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Understanding is, therefore, simply the recognition of ‘specifically ordered features’ 
generating ‘facets’ i.e. features organized in a specific way and creating structures or 
constructs. This would seem to include categories and concepts organized in a specific 
order. Facet-ism is really some kind of constructive structural realism.
86
 Unlike Bunge and 
possibly Marquis, I claim there is no inherent ontological joint on the one hand between 
works of conceptual nature e.g. mathematical constructs and other constructs e.g. mental 
models; pictures, narratives and non-constructs on the other. There are only degrees of 
fiction (the genre) and facets by degree. And these are aspects of all narratives. This allows 
us the possibility (in part following Vaihinger) of distinguishing mathematical-fictions i.e. 
contradictions from mathematical-facets (note that what Vaihinger called “semi-fictions” 
are in my view simply facets). 
The facetist irrealist argument has occurred over a few pages and is summarized in 
definition 4 above. We can fairly suggest that structures are in the world. Facetism is 
incompatible with Elgin/Goodman fictionalism and with Bungean fictionalism for it is 
incompatible with all forms of fictionalism. Facetism is not incompatible with either 
irrealism or with certain elements of Bungean emergentist materialism. I will call 
Elgin/Goodman irrealism: fictionalist irrealism and work to distinguish it from my option 
facetist irrealism. 
We should note here that the position Elgin and Goodman hold (i.e. irrealism) does 
not imply that there are no structures, but rather, that all structures are only a way of 
looking at the world. A structure is but one way the world is imagined to be among an 
infinite number of other possible ways. Once sought after, the structures are indeed there in 
the world. They disappear as soon as we stop finding them. Bunge would agree this is true 
of mathematics and other fictional domains, but false in science and common sense. 
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For example the Pythagorean theorem exists in the sense that it belongs in 
Euclidean geometry. Surely it did not come into existence before someone in the 
Pythagorean school invented it. But it has been in conceptual existence, i.e. in 
geometry, ever since. Not that geometry has an autonomous existence, i.e. that it 
subsists independently of being thought about. It is just that we make the 
indispensable pretence that constructs exist provided they belong in some body of 
ideas—which is a roundabout fashion of saying that constructs exist as long as there 
are rational beings capable of thinking them up. Surely this mode of existence is 
neither ideal existence (or existence in the Realm of Ideas) nor real or physical 
existence. To invert Plato’s cave metaphor we may say that ideas are but the 
shadows of things—and shadows, as is well known, have no autonomous existence. 
((Bunge, 1977, p. 157), our emphasis).
87
 
It should be clear that I am not denying the categorical joint between what we 
ordinarily think to be real and say numbers, shadows or ghosts. Rather, I am arguing there 
are infinitely many real joints and our language contains the capacity to reconfigure them 
for many kinds of reasons.  
Elgin is fairly unsympathetic to David Lewis’s skepticism regarding structures. She 
summarizes Lewis’s argument: 
Even if we knew that the world has the structure our science ascribes to it, we might 
still be wrong; for although that structure is a genuine structure it might still be the 
wrong structure. The order we have discovered may not be the natural order. Indeed 
the actual world might be so gruesome that laws […] could be laws humans beings 
have no reason to believe.
 88
  
Elgin responds showing her instrumentalist colours by saying science is a 
“meritocracy […] For the purposes of science, all schemes of organization that enable us to 
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make maximally good sense of things are equally worthy […] And making good sense has 
to be measured by our own standards; for we have no other.
 89
 
There is no doubt that facetist irrealists and other irrealists are faced with the problem 
I will call the infinity of possible structures. This is another way of talking about the too-
many-categories-problem. The constructivism of Elgin and Goodman links the structures to 
our heads but does not imprison them there. We pick the structure and we decide if it 
works. We do not find a pre-structured-structure out there as realists would claim.  
If this is the case, then strictly speaking: are structures always fictions, even when 
they work? To contend that the workable structure is a fact-of-the-mind-independent-world 
and not a thing-in-our-heads goes too far for both Elgin and Goodman.  
Facetism, nonetheless, remains temporarily compatible with our Strong and Weak 
Theses.  
Weak Thesis Statement—both the arts and sciences can contribute to 
understanding. They are invaluable forms which may always function in radically 
different ways on radically different domains.  
Strong Thesis Statement—the arts contribute to the understanding of a domain 
that is fundamentally inaccessible to the sciences. 
I, therefore, propose two preliminary theorems based on the interconnection of 
concepts local to the notion of fiction, in other words, they derive from my 4 definitions 
supplied above: 
Theorem 1: For all x: If x is a facet, then x is any set of organized features leading to 
understanding. 
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Theorem 2: For all x: If x is the fiction-concept, then x is the empty set. 
I support Theorem 2 by saying the concept cannot be understood otherwise.  
Continuing, I suggest that we place the question, are structures in the mind-
independent-world? into the domain of isp for the time being. The reason for this is strictly 
Bungean: if structures in my head are cognitive, how can they be made of the same stuff the 
universe is made of? One simple solution is the universe is made of mind. Simple, but 
definitely just as puzzling; Bunge points out, if the universe is made of mind then it is fully 
knowable. This leads to unresolved questions that are fundamental to quantum mechanics.  
Another option is that the universe is understood in structures i.e. linguistic and 
symbolic structures, which rely to a certain extent upon isforms. The isf understanding is 
different from the isf being. But, this should not surprise us if we assume that all things 
exist in different ways. 
16. Representation As. To Elgin and Goodman, as we have already seen, 
representations of y depend on denotation whereas y-representations depend on genre. In 
other words the no-target problem resolves by assuming y-representations (or y-models) 
belong to genre or kind. 
Elgin forms a corollary to the notion of representation: She states that on occasion, “x 
can represent y as z”—e.g. a caricature of “Winston Churchill as a bulldog”.90 She further 
explains, this notion of representation-as is central to how models function for scientists. 
Here is why: 
Elgin points out that representation-of (as opposed to representation-as) can be 
accomplished by simple declaration: let x represent y or for our specific purposes, let a 
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model represent a target. Homo sapiens do this regularly and have been for a fairly long 
time, I suspect. This pen which is before me can represent a rocket, a laser beam, 
Macbeth’s dagger, a position relative to my tea cup and this table now represents a hockey 
rink. The tie to representation-as requires another element. The only way to understand the 
concept of representation-as is to invoke what I will call the shared property problem. This 
might alert realists. 
Elgin also notes that ‘resemblance’ or ‘similarity’ are valuable notions but they do 
not solve our problems about what is involved in understanding i.e. representing. 
“Representation is an asymmetrical relation; similarity is symmetrical. Representation is 
irreflexive; similarity is reflexive […] —via stipulation […] pretty much anything can 
represent pretty much anything else”. 91   
Elgin also notes, the problem derives from the notion of similarity itself. She further 
argues that there is always something about any two things that is similar
92
. She points out 
this is the “insight of nominalism”.93 We can note that this implies categories can be drawn 
in potentially infinitely many directions creating infinite possible sets. Are is-forms simply 
models in some sense? 
If we abandon similarity for the moment we notice a curiosity. We can represent 
anything as something else without representing it as itself. All that is required is that the 
symbol that names it denotes the referent as something other than itself. Churchill can be 
represented as a bulldog by either having some similarities with Churchill or by having 
nearly none other than those which all things could share – existence for example.  One can 
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therefore point to a bulldog whose real name is, say, Spike and exclaim, Look it’s 
Churchill! —or name a representation of the same bulldog Churchill. In the first case, the 
name Churchill does not denote the dog – since, the dog’s real name is Spike. But in the 
second case Elgin tells us, (the representation) the name Churchill is fixed to the image in 
the same way that the name Spike is fixed to the dog. The caption or title, Elgin claims 
“fixes the reference”.94  
17. When Can Reference Be Fixed? Elgin is implying she is “externalist” 
regarding reference and meaning, in a similar way to Hilary Putnam’s twin Earth thought 
experiments
95
 and Kripke’s Naming and Necessity.96 However, I have misgivings about 
what to make of the notion that references can be fixed in natural language.
97
 Here’s why: 
that mad dog can be used to denote Churchill or Spike or a wrestler and just about any 
name is as usable as any other. We have no criteria for the naming procedure in natural 
language. There is simply no real or fixed connection between word (sound or prompt) and 
the referent.
98
 This is why: 
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that there are no angels. I do not believe in 
angels. Now, imagine an angel-picture with the caption Churchill. Following Elgin or 
Goodman, we select the genre angel-picture and attach the name Churchill and the viewer 
interprets it as viewers do—possibly as:  
A) Churchill was an angel.  
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Or sarcastically as:  
B) Churchill was no Angel.  
The device (p-representation) does neatly avoid the no target problem. Nonetheless, 
the above is also an example of why natural language cannot be regimented. Name A is just 
as usable as name B. This quality, often referred to as ‘open texture’ in linguistics is what 
allows Homo sapiens to be creative creatures when using natural language. Regimentation 
may simply not be a desideratum where natural language is concerned.
99
  
Scientific languages, on the other hand are regimented based primarily on 
accomplishment. Natural language has too many uses that do not coincide with any specific 
kind of accomplishment. But, reference, it seems, cannot be fixed, in natural language. In 
the sciences regimentation follows the general inter-subjective rules of what constitutes the 
parameters of a scientific object. This puzzle seems to have implications for any useful link 
drawn between scientific representations and artistic representations. H2O would be rather 
useless to chemists if it could be used to refer to Churchill or a dog. This discussion will 
become useful for the word ‘fiction’. While the languages are very different they are 
structured by our concept of fiction. There is, I hope, an a priori and internalist perspective 
to the notion of fiction. If not, I have backed myself into a corner. Objectivity is regained 
regarding internal concepts, if at all, in coherence alone. 
The notion of a shared property is at the heart of our present series of observations. 
We cannot just assume that scientific method applies to natural language. In natural 
language, the nominalist argument seems fair. I could call my dog H2O. But, there are no 
facets connecting the scientific concept of H2O with my dog. If we consider my metaphor 
of a key, the point might be clarified.  
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As the key slides into the lock, the grooves on the blade of the key align with the 
wards in the keyway allowing or denying entry to the cylinder. Then a series of 
pointed teeth and notches on the blade called bittings allow pins or wafers to move 
up and down until they align with the shear line of the inner and outer cylinder, 
allowing the cylinder or cam to rotate freely inside the lock, which opens the 
lock.
100
  
The facets of any theory might nonetheless be like the bittings of the key; ordered in a 
particular way. Understanding is (metaphorically) like opening a lock. 
I will leave this puzzle unresolved for now and hope to resolve it later. I would like 
only to suggest here that there is a fundamental difference between reference in the domain 
of science and reference in the domain of natural language. The sciences use a very 
specialized approach to language and symbol regimentation. Whether or not this aspect of 
reference bears upon our initial assumptions, hypotheses and theses, remains to be argued. 
The fact that we understand each other at all borders on the miraculous. The implication is 
that understanding must rely on another form of structure i.e. pre-regimented structure. In 
his regard, we have some kind of knowledge or know-how. But, it is simpler to call 
whatever it is, linguistic capacity. 
18. Returning to Representation-as and Elgin. Nonetheless, there are many 
examples of representation-as in the sciences. Traffic is sometimes represented as a fluid. 
“A spring is represented as a harmonic oscillator”.101 We can further represent a system 
which is damped by friction, for example, with a non-damped system (perpetual motion). 
As with the angel-picture of Churchill, the goal is to understand how the models, 
representations or images relate to other phenomena.  
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We can see again how this might bother some philosophers. We can model a damped 
system with a fictional non-damped system. Anti-fictionalists counter that the non-damped 
system is not a model of the damped system but rather it is a model of itself. Some anti-
fictionalists would recommend scientists avoid using models altogether. Elgin counters “if 
truth is mandatory, much of our best science turns out to be epistemologically unacceptable 
and perhaps intellectually dishonest”.102 Note that my position is not anti-fictionalist. High 
degrees of fiction found in fictions (the genre) are often fun. In effect the facetist irrealist 
claims that every narrative is partially fictional (the genre), i.e. fictional by degree. 
Objectivity is rebuilt for the fictionalist irrealist (Elgin and Goodman) by invoking the 
notion of degree at the end of the project. As we shall see, versions are created equal, but 
some are more equal than others. Wishing to be fully anti-fictionalist is the same as wishing 
to be God. I propose, therefore, another isp: God.  
I can further clarify this series of observations with an example of an extreme case. 
Imagine a final stage model (i.e. prototype) of a Ford Focus e.g. one which will be crash-
tested and the other, a Ford Focus that comes off the assembly line. Here we have a (final 
stage) model and a target, both of which are extremely similar. (The problem of similarity 
will be handled later) 
1) The only apparatus involved in distinguishing one-as-model and the other-as-
actual is stipulation. The cars could easily be swapped at the last minute.  
2) Something about the logic of how we speak of such things suggests that only the 
model represents the target and not the other way around.
103
  
Following Elgin, the test car is a model of the target, i.e. the design of the fleet of cars 
is instantiated in the two actual models. Now, if I name the test car Churchill one may 
wonder what I am up to. Why name a test car Churchill?  The character of this case 
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hopefully shows how subtle this activity of representation-as really is. Why naming a 
picture of a bulldog Churchill works while naming a Ford crash test model Churchill leaves 
us wondering, is that the activity of representation-as is usually an activity that is supposed 
to contribute to the understanding.
104
 
105
 When it fails to make us understand we begin to 
wonder why. Following my misgivings about linguistic externalism above – we sometimes 
do this for the heck of it. For example, Snoopy is also the only surviving flown lunar 
module from the Apollo 10 mission. There are an infinite number of possible uses for the 
sound or word Snoopy. One could say: Jones is so “snoopy” meaning he is always being 
nosy.  
We may note that scientists continue to use natural language despite their 
involvement in regimented symbol systems. It is not at first obvious whether calling the 
lunar module Snoopy is part of natural linguistic reference or of regimented linguistic 
reference?  It was however, very clear at NASA.  The same argument holds for the crash 
test vehicle Churchill. 
I am going to suggest that we are moving toward what I will call the problem of 
Linguistic Holism. The story of Apollo 10 cannot be divorced from the problem of fiction. 
It is not ‘literally true’ that the lunar module is Snoopy. While, it may have made no 
difference to the program which name was given to the lunar module, what counts is that 
the naming procedure was fully regimented. Linguistic holism might make us wonder if we 
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can distinguish fictions from facets in the language itself. In other words, a fiction is a 
fiction.  
Let’s reconsider Snoopy. Some have argued that there must be some features which 
are exemplified in every instance in which one thinks that’s Snoopy when looking at a 
snoopy-picture. The internalist however can counter as follows: Thinking that’s Linus 
when looking at a snoopy-picture may be of little use.  We are free to use our versions of 
language in any way we wish and it is generally preferable to try to use words as others do. 
Nevertheless, as noted above, we can use the expression that’s Snoopy while looking at the 
Apollo 10 lunar module as well as for the pigeon in the back yard. What then are the 
criteria of regimentation? When and why are members of a community on the same page? 
Are we saying that regimentation is by degree, beginning with natural language use at the 
less regimented end and moving toward the sciences? (I assume there is a natural form of 
regimentation involved in natural language – i.e. possibly the innate elements which make 
understanding possible).  
Linguistic holism fails as a counter-argument to facetism because 1) it fails to 
encompass the notion of faceted by degree and 2) it forces us to be rigid about an entire 
text. What would we make of a poem which has one stanza that is factual and a second that 
is fictional (the genre)? We become unable to specify the genre. It is simply better to 
recognize that one stanza is more faceted than the other. This allows us to further recognize 
that one stanza is fictional (the genre) and the other is biographical or documentary-based 
and preserves the notion of fiction. 
Goodman (1976) and Elgin (1988) distinguish between languages (I prefer language 
use) along the following lines. Languages are “syntactically or semantically dense” by 
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degree. Both Elgin and Goodman tackle regimentation through the notion of density and its 
opposition “repleteness”.106  
If I were to scan and then print a version of an original Schulz snoopy-picture, the 
two images would not be identical, however, they would share many features. And again 
the print would represent the original, but not the other way around. 
107
 
The general view that Elgin and Goodman share is that while we can distinguish between 
symbol systems along lines like analog, digital, density, repleteness, autographic, 
allographic, disjointed, attenuated, these symbol systems are all involved, to a greater or 
lesser degree, in contributing to understanding. I admit that there are times when I read the 
works of Elgin and Goodman, specifically when they concentrate on genre and semantic 
and syntactic density that their irrealism and mine seem identical.  At other times I think 
they have all the features just not in the proper order to be considered faceted. I have the 
same impression with Bunge. The notion of connection is there, however, in both views the 
problem of misrepresenting the concept of fiction is apparent. On the other hand, I may be 
completely off the mark with most of this. But, it areas in which it misses I suggest, it is 
simply un-faceted. 
19. Arguments from Understanding. Facetism is also compatible with our 
internalist claim that science regiments language for a specific purpose in the mind of the 
scientist while natural language is for the most part unregimented.  
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I will use the following strategy of argumentation as I proceed. I will call it and 
similar arguments: arguments from understanding. I am avoiding the expression 
transcendental arguments because it may only raise confusion.  
Kant, it seems, attached the categories to the “possibility of experience”.  Simply 
defined, an argument from understanding shows that fundamental categories (‘categories’ 
preferred by Aristotelians, Kantians, Lockeans
108
 and Peirceans) or primitive (atomic) 
concepts (‘concepts’ preferred by Cartesian Rationalists and modern Chomskyans) create 
the possibility of understanding in the way that Homo sapiens understand. So for example, 
to understand the sentence: I was there yesterday and hope to return tomorrow requires that 
we have among other capacities, the ability to understand past versus future as well as the 
ability to parse the sentence as is generally expected in English. The unintelligible 
statement: I was there tomorrow and hope to return yesterday and others like it, will be 
covered in Chapter 3 in the section influenced by Chomsky, James McGilvray and Paul 
Pietroski dealing with “negative facts”, concepts and Universal Grammar.  
We note that the statement: I was there tomorrow and hope to return yesterday has a 
non-representational quality linking it to artistic abstraction i.e. it is rather poetic.  
One could argue that arguments from understanding cannot generate well founded 
beliefs about the world out there. Nothing about the mind independent world need be a 
reflection of the concepts of understanding. This same strategy has been used by skeptics 
against Kantian transcendental arguments. This is a significant problem because common 
sense must not direct science. These are two different domains.  
As I mentioned above in a footnote, this is not a problem to dismiss lightly, because 
transcendental arguments suffer from the same problem that the Descartes/Anselm 
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ontological arguments for the existence of God do. The mind independent world need not 
follow the mind’s concepts. In what way is the so-called Kantian Copernican revolution 
different from the proof of God based upon the category or concept ‘God’?   
Imagine a chess board of black and white squares—8 squares vertical and 8 squares 
horizontal. The imagined chessboard is an abstract model (Am). There is no target to speak 
of other than the abstract notion of a chessboard. So we can suggest this is an abstract 
model of an abstract target (AmAt ) although one can also imagine one’s real chessboard 
and derive an abstract model and concrete target (AmCt) example if one prefers. We have a 
chessboard model in our heads (or if one prefers, a mental image) with 8 squares on all 4 
sides equaling (I prefer modeling over equaling) 64 squares in total. I will denote this by 
model 8888. Now, let’s try to construct an abstract model with 8 squares on side A; 9 
squares on side B; 10 squares on side C, and 11 squares on side D. The abstract model is 
denotable by simple description. We can even name the model 891011. In effect the 
syntactical instructions are clear. However, we cannot construct 891011 mentally, nor can 
we construct it physically out there.
109
  Another example is a black/white square. One thing 
that falls out of this thought experiment is that the syntactical description carries 
information the concrete model cannot feature. This is a strange negative fact. Narrative 
domains are distinct in how they handle fictionally disorganized elements. 891011 is itself a 
partially faceted narrative (surely ‘8’, ‘9’, ‘10’ and ‘11’ exist in some sense) of a fully 
fictional picture i.e. it successful describes a non-entity that cannot be imaged or built 
mentally or physically without cheating. The same applies for the black/white square. The 
mental image is ordinarily a partially concretized entity. The denotation AmAt of an ideal 
non-target is therefore viable e.g. 891011. The denotation of the concrete non-target AmCt 
is not viable e.g. the impossible to represent entity denoted by 891011. I submit this 
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resolves the denotation no-target problem. It is a self referential paradox. On the one hand it 
denotes nothing, one the other it denotes impossibility. There is an isf of impossibility. Is 
the isf of nothing like the truth of a lie or a black/white square? They cannot be understood. 
Continuing, there are models which can be built, models which cannot be built and 
models which can only partially be built.  The argument from understanding allows us to 
distinguish between models we can create concretely and models we cannot create 
concretely. The attempt to build a concrete model of the ‘object’ denoted by 891011 is what 
I have called above a cognitive virus. We are equipped with the ability to stop trying to 
construct it when we recognize it is flawed. There are similarities here with self referential 
paradoxes. They still must be regarded as partial fictions. The features are not fully 
disordered. They can be likened to 891011. 
Elgin supplies many similar examples using perspective— e.g. foreground objects 
cannot be imagined simultaneously with obscured background objects. 
Wittgenstein’s “duck-rabbit” is another example. We cannot see the duck and the 
rabbit at the same time. We can learn something from the way the mind works from that 
model. Now, there are no duck-rabbits to my knowledge. The duck rabbit picture is a 
CmAt. I imagine we could possibly create some half duck and half rabbit in an Island of 
Doctor Moreau inspired experiment.  Here we could generate a more scientific CmAt 
beforehand. I denoted it above. There are probably genetic models already that are this kind 
of thing. Notice, however that Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit is a different genre of 
representation from the scientific representation generated from the genetic crossfade.
110
 
On the island of Doctor Moreau we would have a real dubbit in the way that we have a 
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mule rather than horse/donkey.
 111
 Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit is simultaneously a picture of 
a duck and a picture of a rabbit to anyone who can read the picture. The realized dubbit is 
neither fully duck nor fully rabbit out there and is not cognitively ambiguous.  
I suggest, therefore, that arguments from understanding are deeply attached to the 
world out there and in a myriad of complex ways. Without them, we may conclude with 
Elgin that “all bets are off”. We must follow certain rules when we build something real. 
Certain of the same rules are involved in what we can mentally model. If we return to the 
categories for a moment, we observe that without the distinction between possible and 
impossible, there simply is no way to understand the difference between the examples of 
the type mentioned above.  
Philosophical positions that are at the extremes are usually founded on the collapse of 
some categorical distinction, e.g, internal versus external. We can see one workable 
strategy against these extreme positions is to be found in arguments from understanding.  
Also of note is that AmAt’s which are mathematical structures do not need to be 
constructible as representations in 3-dimensions to be of interest. Hilbert spaces are the 
perfect example. We can use AmAt’s for mapping n-functions or n-relations. Partial 
differential equations and M-dimensional systems are used in various fields like 
engineering. Just because a model cannot be concretized does not imply it cannot be used.  
Nor, if I am right, does it make it fictional (the concept). 
These examples and others like them will be part of what I will call (following 
Chomsky) negative facts which play a major role in how we use languages, symbol systems 
and our mental model making factories. Language developed the way it did because of 
constraints. 
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There is a final point to be made. There is much interesting work being carried on in 
philosophy of science these days. The examples I offered help to explain why we learn 
from facets. Facets express concrete features thus forming connections. Emphasis in 
philosophy of science on manipulation, prediction, formalizations and connected 
explanations in good natural science are attached to the subtle aspects of facets. 
20. Exemplification of Features. Connected to the questions surrounding 
representation is the notion of exemplification explored by Goodman
112
  and Elgin.
113
 
There are two kinds of reference according to Goodman: denotation and exemplification. 
Exemplification we are told “runs in the opposite direction” to denotation.114  
Given the nominalist idea that anything can be considered similar in some way to 
anything else, we can consider the interesting example of the paint swatch.  
What Elgin notes however, is that exemplification requires both instantiation and 
reference. Exemplification cannot be a case of stipulation in the way that representation is. 
The paint swatch must instantiate, even if only by degree, the property or properties of 
interest. The swatch may instantiate many other properties as well—shape, position, 
printing process, texture. And although some swatches are actually paint, others are 
mixtures of very close combinations of pigment in other binders adjusted and regimented to 
arrive very close to the colour paint that will be used; the instantiation of a specific 
property, the activity, is interpretive. The function of the paint swatch is to work by 
exemplification such that the colour property is made manifest.  
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I would note that paint swatches are essentially ‘written’ in a highly regimented and 
‘scientific’ system. 
Elgin applies her work on exemplification to scientific experimentation. She notes 
that all “scientific experiments are vehicles of exemplification. […] They select, highlight, 
control and manipulate so that their features of interest are brought to the fore”. 115 Elgin 
suggests experiments are “highly artificial” and not “slices of nature” because the natural 
case is rarely an “exemplary case”. This may bring up more misgivings. The structures we 
seek and create may only be faintly out there. If these features are only ghost-like versions 
of the structures we look for. Are we not dealing with fictions again? 
We are still burdened by the question: Is the structure we seek to describe with the 
framework we use in the target itself? There are at least two ways to view this question:  
1) we assume that a structure is a representation i.e. representationalism 
2) we assume that a structure is not a representation i.e. anti-representationalism 
Here is the problem. If we agree that what makes a paint swatch useful is that it 
exemplifies certain features of the actual paint, are we not pointing to an inherent structure 
which is part of both?  
We do not have to be Platonists to resolve this problem. We simply allow that the 
same (isomorphic) or very similar abstract structure is instantiated in two places. 
Unfortunately, what do we make of this notion of partial resemblance (ghost-like versions 
of our structures)? And, what then do we make of the notion of exemplification? Following 
Goodman and Elgin: If denotation is the act of designed-pointing; exemplification is the act 
of defined-searching and structuring. 
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Exemplification is therefore by degree and ultimately dependent upon our definitions. 
Unless, I am mistaken Elgin/Goodman fictionalist irrealism is distinct from mine on one 
point. They (and most philosophers including Bunge and Yablo) treat ‘fiction’ as though it 
is a noun rather than as part of a descriptive noun or as an adjective. Recall that nothing 
talls and similarly nothing fictions. Narratives are simply more or less faceted and more or 
less fictional. This implies that speaking of say, numbers as fictions, is simply using 
language incorrectly. Numbers just are, in the special way that things like numbers are. We 
need them in much the same way as we need hammers and clouds. 
21. Fiction and Metaphor. Elgin compares the arts and sciences in order to 
elucidate her presupposition that from fictions we glean understandings. I will attempt to 
relate it to the above themes and to our initial queries. She provides as example, Jane 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. Elgin’s point is that the novel is a kind of thought 
experiment wherein we may find elements that we can use in our day to day experiences. 
Any attempt to explain every fact of some real story of three or four families in a country 
village would likely never lead to any insights. We would simply be overwhelmed with 
details in the way in which our own lives overflow with information.  Elgin tells us we 
learn things from these fictional characters. That they are fictional does not matter. Again, I 
would counter-argue that the characters are not fully fictional and neither is Pride and 
Prejudice. As I noted above, there is an isf the genre fiction and an isf of the concept 
fiction. They are not the same isf and this generates our isp. 
The same is true for the paint swatch created in pigmented ink rather than actual 
paint. The aspects of interest are brought to the fore sufficiently such that we can use the 
swatch to pick a colour. We do not immediately believe the swatch is a lie of any sort 
because it was not made with the same binding agent (vehicles) i.e. polyvinyl acrylic versus 
nitrocellulose lacquer. We can separate the fiction from the lie. We can see that Elgin is 
offering an argument from understanding. We cannot simply collapse the concept of fiction 
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into the concept of lying. She would contend that anti-fictionalists make a mistake by 
insisting that no understanding can be derived from fiction. On the other hand, would we 
bother modeling frictionless planes if we could understand every real plane perfectly? 
Again, I submit, no understanding can be derived from fiction because pure fiction is 
impossible to understand. It is facets we seek in arts and science and other domains. 
The same kind of argument applies to scientific models. The Ideal gas model is the 
ideal example. There simply is no ideal gas. What then is the connection between a model 
that denotes nothing real and our scientific activity? One answer is that models in science 
may exemplify abstract mathematical relations or structures. According to Elgin, that they 
might be abstract and fictional does not imply they are less informative. This nearly makes 
sense. I would express the sentence as follows: that they might be abstract and partially 
fictional does not imply they are less informative.  
Roman Frigg
116
 makes some interesting arguments warning us against reducing 
models to abstract structures. One obvious reason: models are sometimes easier to ‘see’ 
than are complex mathematical structures. If Frigg is right models are not structures. I 
would argue models represent a mixture of faceted elements and disordered elements 
ordered into structures. Models are representations of facets. Models represent structures. 
 In all cases regarding the so-called fictions described above, Elgin argues, they 
function in that they imply we need to take certain exemplified features seriously. We can 
compare with our “everyday situation”—we can compare with the real phenomena or data.  
We can obtain epistemic access. The behavior of the real may be too complex to model but 
the simplified version helps. For example, there are many gasses out there under many 
differing conditions but, by creating a simplified abstract model we manage to access 
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relations and behavior which would otherwise overwhelm us. We use models to represent 
targets by exhibiting their ordered features of interest and also for contrasting divergences.  
Elgin suggests, we can even exemplify a feature metaphorically. These features of 
interest can be concrete or highly abstract. In the case of caricature, we can use a particular 
representation to bring out something like “nosiness”. We may exaggerate the size of the 
nose in the portrait for our purposes. The feature that we may wish to exemplify may not in 
fact be nose-size at all. Here the notion of structure may only apply in an abstract sense. 
Elgin deals with the role of metaphor in contributing to understanding: She argues against 
Donald Davidson’s view in the following: 
Davidson contends [that] metaphors resist regimentation. He […] concludes that 
terms used metaphorically have no meaning beyond their literal meaning. […] ‘Irate 
aardvark’ denotes nothing but literally irate aardvarks. […] Why one would make 
such an allegation and what others make of it should be left to psychology to 
explain […] Again only science survives.117  
“Metaphorical characterizations, Goodman urges, are no less determinate and no less 
informative than literal characterizations”. 118 In another passage Elgin offers justification 
for the meaningfulness of the notion of metaphor i.e. metaphorical exemplification. 
To call the Watergate conspiracy a cancer on the presidency is to import into the 
political realm a category that literally captures a fatal disease. The metaphor 
captures the conspiracy’s insidious spread and grave implications.119 
Elgin goes further. She contends that “actual science, like other disciplines, is riddled 
with metaphors.
 120
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Metaphor is a device for drawing new lines. It reorganizes the items in a realm, 
grouping together things more familiar categories keep apart, distinguishing among 
things familiar categories group together. But it does not do so arbitrarily. Rather, in 
metaphor we import a scheme that has proven effective elsewhere and apply it to 
reorder a new domain. Metaphor then enables us to recognize membership in 
normally neglected 
classes.
 121
 
 
Examples in cognitive science include elasticity, rigidity and plasticity. If Chomsky 
is right, syntax is hardwired. Experience has no effect on deep syntactic structure. 
Plasticity enters into the explanation of what happens psychologically and 
neurologically when we learn our first language. The changes we undergo are 
profound and enduring. Some neural pathways are strengthened; others are 
permanently extinguished. Elasticity might account for the sort of psychological 
changes we undergo when, for example, we memorize irregular verbs for an 
upcoming exam. Such learning causes a change of mind, but not a particularly deep 
or lasting one. Even though we call both the acquisition of a first language and an 
American student’s rote memorization of the French verb “aller” instances of 
language learning, they seem quite different. The metaphor enables us to express the 
difference. Literal, entrenched taxonomies tend to rigidify thought, guiding it along 
well-worn channels toward clearly demarcated goals. Metaphor reconfigures the 
domain, drawing boundaries that cut across familiar distinctions, disclosing features 
of the terrain that hitherto eluded our gaze.
 122
 
 
The metaphor highlights affinities within and across domains. It likens its referent 
both to other members of the metaphorical extension and to their literal 
counterparts.[...] Once we recognize the constellation of factors a metaphor 
exemplifies, we can investigate whether the conception that underlies them is 
sound. Is there a sharp divide between hardwired, plastic, and elastic traits? Or can 
some things be, for example, either plastic or elastic? How resistant to reversal does 
a trait have to be to be considered plastic? Does the mind’s plasticity diminish with 
age? And so forth. The metaphors reveal new avenues of inquiry worthy of 
exploration”. 123 
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I contend that these are passages where Elgin is at her best. Here, she is preserving 
both Thesis 1 and Thesis 2. We have not yet determined which is best. From metaphors we 
glean understanding in art and science. What is the difference? Metaphors are not a ‘genre’ 
they are an active part of speech. We do not say we watched a metaphor but we do say we 
watched a fiction. Metaphors are well formed. They express so much in all the subtle ways 
Elgin suggests. The notion of literal truth only clouds our picture
124
. Metaphors are not 
fictions. Now we have an isf metaphors versus isf literal propositions. Metaphors are 
understandable… pure fictions are simply the expression of pure misunderstandings. There 
is a possible set of comprehensible metaphors. Pure fiction is by definition 
incomprehensible. 
Axiom 1: x is a metaphor implies that x is comprehensible and therefore not fictional 
(the concept). 
 
Axiom 2: If x or x
’
 is fully fictional (the concept) in a math-language or in natural 
language it implies that x or x
’ 
is incomprehensible. 
Still, nothing is certain regarding whether some aspect is a feature of the target or not. 
For that we need to consider notions like “fit” and “better versions”. Math-languages need 
not respond to anything beyond the language for confirmation. 
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Chapter 2 
 
22. A Review. We need to put a few parts together before we continue. Suárez  
explains: 
Fictions are, for Vaihinger, accounts of the world and its systems that not only are 
plainly and openly false, but knowingly so, yet remain indispensable in theorizing—
in science and elsewhere.
 125
 
Another strategy for understanding the problem with this view is that it under-defines 
the notion of ‘fiction’. If we are to follow the concepts and categories to their bitter ends 
and we must then we are going to have to do this so that none are dropped.  What I am 
aiming at here is that our common sense notion of referring to specific works with the word 
‘fictions’ and to others as ‘biographies’ is a stylistic use of the term, not a conceptual one. 
Fiction is a genre. Biography is another genre. There are no biographies from the standpoint 
of isf concepts but only from the standpoint of the isf genre. A biography in the conceptual 
sense would be the entire story of the world line of an individual. God alone is reading your 
biography accept that your perfect biography is nothing other than you.  
This is why Goodman spends time on the genre of realism in painting and other arts. 
The powerful quality of Languages of Art is that it is a book about the semantic and 
syntactic aspects of understanding in general.  
Categories do not generate being they generate understandings or ways of being. 
They are what Vaihinger suggests, we use categories to treat objects “as if” they existed—
they are what Kant explained: the possibility of understanding.  
Perhaps I can tie this up by recalling my hinge argument:  
To deal with statements of the form “Jimi was on fire” we need to do one of the 
following 3 options:   
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1) Treat the proposition as though it must only express truth i.e. the way that 
positivists would i.e. make meaning depend upon being. 
2) Treat the proposition as either literally true or metaphorically true i.e. make 
meaning depend upon truth. 
3) Treat the proposition as though it is categorically dense (conceptually structured) 
and meaningful under certain interpretations but not others i.e. make the meaning 
depend upon the sentence structure.  
 
The problem with 1 is it generates an unwarranted rigidity – there are far too many 
subtleties in our natural language. This is the kind of move made in philosophy of language 
by the positivists and Davidson, Putnam, Quine, Lewis and exactly what troubled 
Wittgenstein. We can call this approach to meaning epistemologism re: meaning. 
The problem with 2 is it generates an enormous number of kinds of truth; 
metaphorical; literal; religious; scientific, yours, mine, partial, fictional. We can call this 
view relativism re: meaning. 
Finally, 3 makes the meaning of the proposition depend not on forms of being – real, 
less real, fictional, semi-fictional, nor on forms of truth but on categories i.e. is-forms or is-
functions and the rules of symbolic structures. (Sometimes innate and sometimes 
regimented). 
This is not a coherence theory of truth. However, it is a coherence theory for sentence 
structure and therefore a coherence theory of understanding. Well, what is understanding if 
not coherence? 
There is a relationship to a particular reading of Wittgenstein here which I accept. In 
both 1 and 2 language has “gone on holiday”. Where Wittgenstein goes wrong, however, is 
that as a behaviorist, he places the notion of meaning in community. But, there are two 
ways (at least) to approach this: 
1) The behaviorist reading which suggests that we learn our natural languages from 
our parents and communities. 
76 
 
 
2) The nativist reading which suggests we learn regimented languages in 
communities by agreement but that we have the basis of our natural language when 
we are born in an innate capacity. This does not imply that we do not require specific 
inputs along the way. Nor does it imply that we come with concepts which we 
understand as hanging together in exactly the same way. Socrates, we may recall, 
guides Meno’s slave boy through various steps. Nonetheless, it would seem that the 
concepts entail how they are to be understood. By now, we are beginning to see the 
lines of the political and practical implications. I will cover this in the final section 
which deals briefly with politics.  
The notion of “form of life” has two more possible readings. It reflects the type of 
life-form we are and the notion of agreement to certain aspects of regimentation. We are 
born with a structuring capacity. We do not learn this from anyone. It is built in the way our 
physical architecture is built in. So the intuition that math objects exist forever may derive 
from the fact that they only exist insofar as they can be understood and that strictly 
speaking is the way the world must be.  
This drives a wedge between the use of languages which are scientific and the use of 
non-scientific languages. Symbol systems are separated by their inherent structures. To 
understand the symbol system is to play by its rules. Wilfred Sellars is well known  “for his 
distinction between the “manifest image” and the “scientific image” of the world”.126 I am 
advocating something very similar. Languages and symbol systems are divergent.  
If we look at the different forms of language (as Goodman did in Languages of Art) 
we discover that they need to be understood in different ways. Regimented languages can 
immediately be distinguished from natural language, which are regimented through some 
deep grammatical structure. This is the point Wittgenstein missed and which Chomsky 
introduced. The poverty of stimulus argument and the fact that children acquire a language 
as quickly as they do clearly imply some complex language acquisition device.  
                                                          
126
deVries, W. (2011) “Wilfrid Sellars” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Zalta E. N. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sellars/    consulted on 1/31/2011. 
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 So, for example, that 2+2=4 is simply to found in the understanding of the concepts. 
The structure of the language determines its meaning and truth value. There is no question 
of ‘being’ and therefore there is no question of truth based upon being. Numbers exist as 
symbols representing the interplay of concepts in a specific symbol system.  
Other languages are different. Scientific languages often require that the symbols be 
measured against the world. This is done through manipulation, prediction, coherence with 
other good science and explanation. I submit therefore that a fiction (the concept) in science 
is the one that does not succeed in any of these ways. This limits the region of discourse in 
the following way. A facet-free model is a pure fiction. The aspects of the model which are 
facets are not fictional even if they only provided a ghostly glimpse at structure. Facets are 
simply the bits that fit. 
In order to preserve the categorical distinction between fiction and non-fiction we 
need to make this move. While the entire story of the plum-pudding-model-of-the-atom is 
fictional, its value is found in the non-fictional elements. If this were not the case we could 
not immediately replace the plum-pudding part of the model with a panetone part. The 
panetone-model-of the-atom is probably just the same model.  
To say that fictions (the genre) are used in science is to say that there are aspects of 
the model which may be heuristic but that are fundamentally irrelevant i.e. replaceable by 
other elements. Fictions (the concept) are not used for gleaning understandings but rather 
facets are.  I therefore reject assumption 1 with respect to the sciences.  
I however, also reject assumption 1 for the arts and all other domains. If the concept 
fiction/non-fiction is to hold in natural language as it must, we should also insist that we 
learn from facets not from fictions. The elements that properly describe the real in any 
fiction are the fodder for the gleaning of understandings.  
All narratives are a mixture of fictional elements and faceted elements. They are 
faceted by degree. 
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Recent studies in neurology and psychology,
127
 which deal with dreaming, may be 
useful in our consideration of fiction versus non-fiction. It seems that both REM and non-
REM dreaming allow us to experiment with scenarios that can at times be contrary to our 
evidence and contrary to our beliefs.
128
 It seems, we learn by simulation while we sleep. 
Evidence suggests that the ability to perform specific tasks increases after sleep when 
participants dream about the tasks they had been assigned before getting into bed. Similar 
studies were conducted on animals with highly congruous results. We can theorize about 
practice; even while we sleep. The point is that the dream cannot be characterized as 
fictional (the concept). For example, if we dream of skiing, there are non-fictional aspects 
to the dream. The features of the dream that are facets are what we learn from. There are 
skies in my dream and snow and the sun. A dream without any facets simply does not exist, 
for it could express nothing.
129
 A dream with very few facets drifts toward 
incomprehensibility but is still worth having. Dreaming is fundamental to rest. 
Even, a priori work is a form of evidence. We have the mental capacity to work 
“online” and “offline” (one contemporary way130 of discussing a priori work is to call it 
offline, or what Galen Strawson refers to as “the work I do while sitting on my couch”) e.g. 
wondering what might have happened if Napoleon had had nuclear weapons, or if Stephen 
Harper continues his path toward deregulation re: big business etc. Thinking the narrative 
has “possible truth conditions” is evidence that our language has “taken a holiday”.  
By affirming assumption1, I am in effect preserving the categorical distinction 
between fictions and non-fictions or facets. Again, I am not however an anti-fictionalist in 
                                                          
127
 Zadra A., Desjardins, S. Marcotte, E. (sous presse). Evolutionary function of dreams: A test of 
the threat simulation theory in recurrent dreams.   
128
 I am avoiding “counterfactual”. 
129
 I am not suggesting that the sole function of dreaming is learning. 
130
 Chomsky. 
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the loose sense of the term. I recommend that everyone enjoy fictions (the genre) even 
when they are almost empty of facets. i.e. fairly non-faceted. An implication of this is that 
there are probably no perfectly facet-free-fictions but there are examples which approach 
this. Abstract art contains real elements: Colours, forms and so on. Goodman notes that no 
artwork is fully free of reaching beyond itself. But by the same argument there can never be 
a perfectly faceted way the world is. It must always contain some element of fiction. The 
element of fiction is the limit of the theory. Hence Irrealism. There is no one way the world 
is because there can be no one use of categories for everything. The way the world is, is 
simply everything. The way the world is, for us, is to point to a specific language we are 
using. Every language is cognitive. There is no way the world is for us outside of the 
cognitive language we represent it with.  
23. Fit. Elgin points out that “fit”, like exemplification, is by degree. There are, she 
claims “perfect fits and loose fits” and representations that “do not fit” their target system at 
all. Models can be adjusted or tweaked to fit better on occasion.  
This brings us to another recurring theme: often models diverge from the target and so are 
only “approximately true” or “true enough”.131 That “[a] representation is true enough for 
some purpose or in some respects but is not true enough in others” should not be a surprise 
to us. The “accuracy of models” is “limited”. 132 
We do not need to characterize approximate truth as “not literally true”. Elgin’s 
cautiousness, when it comes to truth-talk, is nonetheless admirable. But approximation 
should be construed as faceted, not false or fictional. Scientists regularly add plus and 
minus conditions to their work. So to say that some value x is close and possibly off by 
some y is to admit details of experimental procedures and models that cannot properly be 
described by “felicitous falsehood.”  
                                                          
131
 Elgin, C. Z. (2004) “True Enough”, p. 113-131. 
132
 Elgin, C. Z. (2010) “Keeping Things in Perspective”, p. 11. 
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24. Resemblance. Elgin unpacks the concept of resemblance in the following way. 
Often, a model fits a target by exemplifying similar features. She offers an example to show 
resemblance is insufficient to properly express the complexity of this idea. Increasing 
resemblance between model and target does not necessarily provide greater understanding. 
Elgin points to the vast quantity of data that was faxed to NASA before the tragic accident 
of the space shuttle Challenger which was caused by degradation of a rubber O-ring. The 
danger was simply and sadly “obscured by a mélange of other data that was included”. 133 
More data implies greater resemblance and greater detail—not greater understanding. “Data 
instantiated but did not exemplify”.  “The goal […] is to afford understanding, […] merely 
representing the data in relevant respects is not sufficient.  
“The representation must make the resemblance manifest”. 134 Therefore, we should 
understand Elgin would not have us give up on resemblance entirely. It would seem 
properties can have the quality that they can be shared. Again, while model and target may 
share properties, this is not sufficient to glean understanding. 
The paradigm, it seems, has begun to shift radically. Fiction, we are told, seems 
preferable to fact in this case. Avoiding information brings out what counts to us. There are 
infinite many organizations of information all of which are fictive. What counts to us in this 
specific case is only one construction. It should be noted also that the construction could 
have been organized with many other pieces of information. 
Elgin has mixed her valuable commitment to the irreal nature of all constructs with 
the faceted aspects from which we glean understandings. There are many possible 
structures which allow us to notice the cause of the Challenger tragedy. Those which are 
relevant as cause are implicated and so must be considered something other than fiction. 
The narrative of the event, like all models, is faceted and it can be told in many ways all 
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 Elgin, C. Z. (2010) “Keeping Things in Perspective”, p.11. 
134
 ibid., p. 12. 
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presumably leading to the rubber O ring. This does not make it more of a fiction because 
there are missing features. It is irrelevancies that ultimately create fiction not facets. 
Copious amounts of information create fiction through disorganization. It is not 
information left out which is fiction but facets left out.  
25. Objectivity Remade. Need we give up on objectivity? No. According to Elgin 
the issue surrounds properly understanding the notion of objectivity and distinguishing it 
from accuracy. 
 Elgin argues, accuracy can be achieved with a hunch. For example, if on one 
occasion I throw a dart while blindfolded at a target and the dart hits the bulls-eye, the shot 
may be deemed accurate but it is hardly the result of skill—at least in my case.   
But, Elgin claims rightly, that objectivity is about skills, norms, standards and inter-
subjective conventions. We have techniques and methods which have succeeded over the 
years.  
We can also draw a line between artistic representations which rely on interpretation 
and scientific representations. Very subtle differences are key in one domain in a different 
manner than they are in the other. The aesthetic world allows for “endless contestability” 
and is more “tenuous” than are the sciences.  
Objectivity and subjectivity belong to a continuum […] So although scientific models 
of non-existent entities and fictional portrayals do not accurately mirror anything in 
the world, they are capable of figuring in an understanding of the world
135
. 
This is very close. The notions of “fictional portrayals” and “scientific models of non-
existent entities” are close to being properly formed and compared conceptually. They are 
either fictional (the concept) or they are faceted by degree. The faceted aspects are what we 
learn from. Ultimately, there are no perfectly fictional portrayals. 
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 Elgin, C. Z. (2010) Op. cit. p. 16 
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I have argued above that artistic practice on many occasions does not need to be 
representational at all. It does not even need to contribute to the understanding in any 
obvious way. This is an aspect of how artistic creativity can be free. In this regard artistic 
practice sometimes creates objects that are more like flowers and sunsets. We are free to 
interpret them in the ways we want to. The same is true for aspects of natural language. We 
are free to play with words. Pace, positivists who blame the worst on poets and 
metaphysicians, we cherish freedom. 
I would add also that here are similar examples in the sciences. Mathematicians 
regularly work on problems that have no apparent application. Often, the equation becomes 
useful later on. Brian Cox and Jeff Forshaw
136
 point this out about Maxwell’s equations in 
their book E=mc
2
. All mathematical equations are fully fictional equations if they are self 
contradictory. Mathematical equations like everything we do with our brains including 
perceptions are irreal by degree. Therefore, we define: 
 Definition 5: For any mathematical sentence A: A =df  fiction (the concept)  A is 
incomprehensible. 
26. Category Mistakes and Verbal Disputes: We might wish to be slightly 
revisionist regarding philosophical terminology. Many of us have found ourselves in a 
disagreement only to recognize that the definitions of our terms determine the nature of that 
disagreement. In recent years, the expression ‘verbal dispute’ has been coined to denote this 
linguistic frustration. One suggested resolution is to supply a new “neutral vocabulary”.   
Similarly, Frege’s craving for an ideal philosophical, scientific and mathematical 
language exemplifies this way of thinking.
137
 Frege, however, may not have been involved 
in a normative project regarding language—he was intent on distinguishing science from 
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 Cox, B. and Forshaw, J. (2009) Why E=mc
2
 and why should I care? p. 22-33. 
137
 Seymour, M. (2005), L’Institution  du langage, p. 228-43. See 13 characteristics of Frege’s Ideal 
Language. 
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psychologism.
138
 Nonetheless, the craving to limit our meanings is at least as old as 
philosophy itself. Even the Pre-Socratics and Plato were obsessed with the meaning of 
various words commonly taken for granted. At any rate there are arguably several good 
reasons, say, for naming only one tooth number 17.
139
 There might, nonetheless, be certain 
pre-scientific advantages to this – science, after all, must have grown out of natural 
language. 
Debates naturally rage on about the possibility of idealizing language with the 
ramifications of attempting to clean our philosophical language thankfully spilling over 
into the political and ethical.  
I do, however, contend that we should stop using the word ‘fiction’ as a noun in 
philosophy of science, unless we wish to speak loosely about genre.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
138
 ibid., p. 240. 
139
 One of the many characteristics of science is linguistic and/or symbolic regimentation. 
Regimentation alone is insufficient. How and whether this applies to philosophy is another matter. 
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Chapter 3 
27. Epistemology. I agree with Frege, regarding denotation, with one caveat. 
Mathematical expressions, to the extent that they are coherent and consistent, have truth 
indicators, they do not quite denote the truth. What this means is that they supply the 
instructions for how to go about accepting or rejecting them internally. This is not the case 
for most other kinds of sentences and symbol systems. Many have their own structural 
consistencies, which allow them to be meaningful by making us search externally. I would 
further argue that natural language allows for meaning across the entire range, internal 
meaning (conceptual consistency), external meaning (factually derived) and levels of 
disorder and play. All forms are of interest. 
Arriving at Elgin’s epistemology, we can note the following major points: 
1) Elgin’s virtue epistemology has ties to the Aristotelian notion of the golden mean 
between extremes —she unpacks many binary concepts or categories (e.g. solid 
versus fragile, sameness versus difference, lying versus truth-telling, fiction versus 
non-fiction) and finds the mean.  This is an excellent strategy. She maintains 
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linguistic categories. I already touched on it in the short discussion of arguments 
from understanding.
140
 
2) Elgin argues that veritism is too extreme.141 She also states that while we should 
never “jettison concern for truth” we should recognize that veritism would imply the 
loss of many valuable tools that yield understanding—models, idealizations, curve-
smoothing, a fortiori arguments, ceteris paribus claims—are often only true enough 
and sometimes not true at all. However, what counts is that they work for us in 
contributing to understanding. Elgin is sympathetic to instrumentalism. This is very 
acceptable. From it we can derive irrealism but as I have argued above these are 
not properly construed as fictions. 
3) Elgin argues for “cognitive acceptability” based on the idea that we often accept 
divergences from truth at the level of idealization that is of interest to us.
 142
 I would 
argue divergence from true statements cannot be tied to the concept of ‘fiction’. 
4) “That misunderstanding involves representing things as they are not, does not entail 
that whenever we represent things as they are not, we misunderstand them”. 143 
Facetist irrealism is the view that all brain children are misrepresentations by 
degree. This is nonetheless compatible with understanding. 
5) “Felicitous falsehoods” are fictions that contribute to our understanding. I would 
prefer to say: All understanding implies missing information. Elements in fictional 
narratives (the genre) and quasi-faceted models connect with their targets through 
facets. 
6) Elgin in “Skepticism Aside” argues for relevance in epistemology. E.g. there is no 
need for a doctor to solve the riddles of skepticism before making a diagnosis. Elgin 
points out the following: 
a) warrant implies reasons 
b) reasons are qualitative (better or worse) 
c) epistemic acceptability is backed by sufficiently good reason 
                                                          
140
 The categories are infinite. Whether there are primitives suggested by Aristotle, Locke, Kant, 
Pierce is not addressed in this paper. Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction is a categorical 
distinction of great significance. It allows to to distinguish scientific mind independent constructs 
from mind dependent constructs. 
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 Elgin defines ‘veritism’ as the epistemological stance that science must pursue truth at all costs. 
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   I support a version of epistemological internalism (i.e. there are sentences which 
imply we need to look for truth indicators.)  
 
7) We are justified in pushing “skepticism aside”. We can accept that “Descartes 
demon” may never be fully extinguished however, we naturally “assume” that 
extreme skeptical scenarios do not obtain and it makes perfect sense to do so. Elgin 
distinguishes between belief (the feeling of having an opinion i.e. defined as a 
representation) and acceptance upon which we are willing to act.  
Elgin states, “[i]f a skeptical scenario obtains all bets are off”.  This may be too 
strong as we shall see. 
28. Some Preliminary Epistemological Concerns. The following will pertain to 
issues regarding laws, causality, so-called “occult powers” and action at a distance. Bell’s 
theorem, the Einstien-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and the Copenhagen interpretation must 
leave us wondering if we have a proper understanding of causality. Even experiments since 
seem to point away from “local realism”. The problem of free will is an isp. In my 
interpretation (rather unqualified I admit) causality is simply a faceted model with some 
disorganised features. I do not want to support the extravagant implications of this notion, 
however, I cannot fully deny them.  
I define weak scientific realism as the view that we are very justified in believing that 
the practice of science reveals truths about nature.  I would define scientific realism as the 
certainty that science reveals truths about nature. How one approaches epistemology will 
likely determine to which of these two camps one is more sympathetic. Epistemology is 
somewhat subject to taste. I recognise this maybe somewhat controversial. Nonetheless, 
here is why: 
The issue ultimately relies on the strength of thought experiments like Brains in Vats 
and demonic deception. Many of these arguments are based on fundamental questions of a 
cosmological nature. Do we hold all the cards? Are we being fooled? I will call these types 
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of arguments Knowledge Terminating Cosmologies (KTC).  We can consider the argument 
as follows: 
P: scientists know truths about nature.  
We justify this claim P with evidence.  
We ultimately determine whether or not these elements of evidence are reliable.  
Believing that P seems justifiable and we call it knowledge. 
 
P: scientists do not know truths about nature.  
We justify P with elements of evidence. 
We ultimately determine whether KTC thought experiments are reliable evidence.  
Believing that P seems justifiable. 
 
Most of us probably believe that P is more justifiable than P. The position P is a 
form of scepticism. However, can we afford to assume a high ground over P andP?  
There are two possible interpretations of Bertrand Russell’s famous teapot thought 
experiment that show this curiosity. The philosopher who asserts  (P) is faced with 
proving it—a problem which may be as difficult as the opposing view. I doubt that there is 
a microscopic teapot in orbit around the sun which is smaller than any device that we can 
develop to see it. I also doubt that our entire universe is actually in this kind of teapot.  The 
denial of any hypothesis, is nonetheless, an assertion. The KTC hypothesis is difficult to 
rule out. 
The argument raises the Burden of Proof Problem but the value of sceptical scenarios 
is that they remind us of our fallibility. It justifies irrealism to the extent that it makes us 
aware there is a possible scenario which in fact will obtain at time t and which converts our 
assertion that p to an assertion of p. Therefore by knowledge K we mean, possibly 
proposition p by justifications J1… Jn. Possibility is important here because we can 
imagine very many true propositions that have no accessible justifications. For example, we 
need the category true/false to understand the notion of the perfect crime. 
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 Definition 6: By x knows (K) proposition p we should mean that p is possible and p 
is possibly justifiable by (J1...Jn).  Kxp=df p J1…Jn 
The symbol system or language offers us nothing other than instructions for 
understanding. Thus Kx  Bx + warranted justifications i.e. fallibilism. We can see, 
however, that all we have is warranted believing. Believing well is a form of behaving well.  
In an email correspondence with Elgin, she added, Kx  Bx + warranted 
justifications + approximations that are true enough. 
However, all bets may still be off. If we allow that there are KTC we must similarly 
allow for belief terminating cosmologies (BTC). The future of our unfolding universe may 
dwindle into nothingness. Without a backup on a hard drive, it is hard to argue we ever 
existed or that we ever believed or knew anything. Nihilism is unfortunately very coherent.  
In that sense, not only would our brain children be irreal but so would everything made of 
matter. If there are recurrent big crunches the same problem obtains. We are essentially 
erased.  
Even the notion of know-how collapses. But, we don’t even have to go that far. There 
is a problem of parsimony in this puzzle. We only need bivalence to explain the inner 
workings of our universe. Forces either attract or they repel. With assent and dissent do we 
not have enough to explain our epistemology in biological systems? Can we not be 
eliminativist regarding certainty and proof? Do we need more than fictions and facets? Can 
we use ‘true’ to simply mean well-faceted? Not quite. We require the category isf truth to 
create the possibility of fallibilism. This would seem to imply there is no definition of truth 
beyond its being simply a category of understanding underwriting the notion of fallibility. 
If this makes sense most of epistemology is cognitively viral. 
Reinterpreting Vaihinger’s philosophy of as if, we are committed to treating each 
other as if we exist. The same holds for atoms and numbers. The facets left over in story of 
phlogiston are found in its failure to successfully organise the features it was created to 
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organise. We may, therefore, treat phlogiston as if it is fundamentally fictional 
(disorganised) avoiding the problem of being entirely.  
Finally, the intuition of the positivists may still be correct, although as I said above 
their medicine would kill the patient. Quite possibly, there is no resolution to existence 
questions. If we build explanations out of languages, it is fairly clear, that there are things 
we cannot build e.g. 891011.  
This leaves me agnostic on the idealism/physicalism debate and slightly favouring 
idealism (50.01%). This is an isp at the exterior of my capacity to form any beliefs. 
29. Some Negative Remarks. I will offer a list of criticisms of Elgin’s work here 
implying only that it is a little too optimistic. This seems fair of Goodman also. They are no 
doubt perspectivalists i.e. aware that all constructs are irreal, however, they seem to avoid 
the problem of agency. 
1) Elgin does not focus on agency enough. This results in a conflation of models out 
there with models in the mind – an impression of model and linguistic externalism 
results.  
2) Without basing the discussion on agency, the resulting story is too optimistic. 
Model-making goes hand in hand with interpretation.  Models do not misrepresent. 
People use them in various ways. Propaganda, for example. It is likely that models 
are made for misrepresenting more frequently than for representing. This notion 
needs to be emphasized. 
3) The notion of scientific endeavor is insufficiently contrasted with artistic endeavor 
deriving from the belief that both rely on ‘ficitons’. The arts derive from common 
sense. Artists may use sketches, scores and scripts which can be somewhat 
regimented – but the goal in art when there is an epistemological one at all is 
common sense knowledge not scientific knowledge. This leads to a slight bias 
toward the belief that art must create understanding. This is an underlying and 
unfounded aesthetic.  
30. Philosophy of Science and Models in the Literature. Model-making often 
helps us understand the world. We could probably even say understanding is simply a kind 
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of model-making. Here our definition of “model” is extremely broad. This is not 
necessarily a problem and it also helps explain why the literature on models is vast.  
In the literature we find many ontological considerations regarding models. For 
instance we can read that models are used to represent or exemplify certain features of a 
target system. Also, models are sometimes abstract and sometimes concrete entities. 
Therefore, there are four logical possibilities generated from the simple categorical 
distinction between concrete and abstract, which I began to distinguish above. They are:
144
 
 
 
 
Max Black, in his Models and Metaphors (1962) was very preoccupied with the 
relation between language and model. Language use and model-making are intricately 
connected, but we can easily note that model-making is not necessarily a linguistic activity, 
though on occasion it can be. It is hard to draw a clear line between linguistic models and 
non-linguistic models. Ian Hacking in his Representing and Intervening (1983) draws a 
distinction between kinds of models; some “you could hold in your head rather than in your 
hands”.145 The topic of modeling is therefore also linked to mental imagery or mental 
models.  
Returning to the broadness problem, regimenting begs the question: who will 
regiment and for whom? Even if one would like to answer: ‘we’ philosophers, of course!—
it is hardly a story that will make headlines on the news at 6. Furthermore, experimental 
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philosophy can help us recognize just how diverse are ‘our’ opinions in philosophy.146 
What would one expect? I have serious doubts concerning the general usefulness of 
attempting the regimentation of natural language in any sense other than in one’s own 
work.
 147
 The broadness problem may be unavoidable though possibly not a significant 
problem. 
However, interpreting models, to the extent that it is accomplished with language, 
necessarily returns us to problems in philosophy of language and thus many of the most 
salient topics in philosophy of language pertain to a discussion of model-making. Giere and 
others mention this point in recent articles.
148
  
This brings us to a connected problem: i.e. natural language use is fundamentally 
unregimented and this is an endless source of confusion for philosophers who are fans of 
the arts and sciences. Progress is slow, although this seems to be changing due to the 
internet. 
31. Agency. Though it may seem trivial at first, the emphasis on any exploration of 
models, theories, narratives, pictures, maps etc., as I have stated above, must be placed on 
agency and on interpretation. The white lie argument simply reminds us that scientists and 
philosophers are human and not always guided by a concern for the category truth. 
We can argue, following Suarez (2003) and Giere (2004) that the study of the 
relationship between model and target must include an agent i.e. people use models for 
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 Weinberg J. M., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. (2001) “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” as well 
as philpapers.org survey. 
147
 My doubts derive from the work of and communications with Noam Chomsky, James 
McGilvray and Paul Pietroski. 
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 See Giere, R. N. (Forthcoming), “An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific 
Representation”.  
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certain purposes not all good.
149
 Someone has to set-up models for them to be models. “So 
the formula is:  
Agents 1) intend; 2) to use model M; 3) to represent a part of the world, W; 4) for 
some purpose P.
 150
 
I am generally highly sympathetic to Giere’s views on agency. I am at odds however 
with an aspect of his interpretation of model-making in relation to work being carried out in 
linguistics. 
In “An Agent-based Conception of Scientific Models and Representation”, Giere 
calls his approach “anti-Chomskyan”. It seems to me that exactly the opposite is true. 
Giere, I gather, has an incorrect interpretation of Chomsky's linguistics. In “Language and 
Nature”, Chomsky outlines the importance of agency while analyzing reference in his 
unique fashion. Here is what Chomsky has to say:  
Person X refers to Y by expression E  with its intrinsic semantic properties, to talk 
about the world from certain intricate perspectives, focusing attention on certain 
particular aspects of it, under circumstances C, with the ‘locality of content’151 they 
induce.
 152
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If we add Agent, Model and Purpose into Chomsky’s expression we are fairly close 
to Giere’s formulation: the formula mentioned above is: Agents 1) intend; 2) to use model 
M; 3) to represent a part of the world, W;
 153
 4) for some purpose P.  
Nevertheless, I agree with Giere that the study of reference has close ties to the topic 
of model-making and to all forms of representation, artistic, scientific or other. However, 
models (Cm) are out there like words (spoken or written) are out there. They are prompts 
which we ultimately make out there. As with a street sign, the word, e.g. north prompts me 
to think north conceptually and attaches to the “local” conceptual meaning in my head. 
Chomsky's work is usage-based and agent-based. In general, his arguments have 
more to do with the scientific study of the language faculty and he argues that the study of 
externalized language (E-Language) is not a viable scientific topic. I also doubt that the 
study of E-models is similarly of any use. 
While Chomsky would agree with many of Giere’s arguments regarding “An Agent-
based Conception of Scientific Models and Representation”, Chomsky simply uses the 
study of usage to get at how we acquire language i.e. the language faculty. He studies usage 
all the time. Negative facts and the poverty of stimulus arguments are examples.  
Goodman’s work in Languages of Art puts forward the notion that understanding is 
fundamentally symbol system dependant. But, these systems have a biological origin. We 
cannot study the faculty of understanding the way we study visual faculty because the way 
Homo sapiens understand is fairly unique. The visual faculty is more primitive and 
arguably mental model-making (AmCt at least) can probably be found in other animals. 
Whether AmAt’s are ever made by non-human animals is another empirical question. 
                                                          
153
 We can allow that mathematical models are a part of the world. This is at the heart of my 
argument. 
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Much of what is above forms the basis of Chomsky’s often misunderstood critiques 
of Behaviourism and Empiricism.  
 1) These arguments regard methodology: coherent scientific work is not 
accomplished by looking at masses of statistics. Rather scientists work by creating a 
model of an idealized situation and by developing experiments to find a data model 
which either supports the model or refutes it. Models with facets connect while 
models with too many fictional elements disconnect. 
 2) Usage is infinite. What parts should we gather? Isn’t any decision about what to 
include or what not to include completely arbitrary if we proceed by studying usage?  
3) Scientists after Galileo and Descartes began to ask why. Simply saying that 
“bodies fall to the ground because they seek their natural place” did not get at the 
more in depth elements of cause. The profound questions are very puzzling: why can 
we speak or think and why can we make models? Why can we understand each 
other?  
Neither Chomsky, nor Giere disagree that, in all cases, while the natural or real events 
(targets) as well as concrete models share a kind of independence from the agent, the agent 
herself establishes the parameters of her experiments and ultimately sees the model as a 
model. Elgin and Goodman would also agree with this point. Thus agency must be the 
foundation of the study, which carries with it the notion of irrealism (i.e. the metaphysics of 
perspectivalism). 
The study of models is therefore the study of the use and acquisition of the model-
making factory which is located in our heads. Presumably, rocks and forces are not artefacts 
in the way that Ford Model T’s and the Bohr model are, but we only understand rocks and 
forces to the extent that we do, whatever they may really be, through models and theories. 
Any concrete model out there cannot be differentiated from any other thing out there 
without the concept of agency. This supports facetist irrealism not fictionalist irrealism 
because Bunge’s intuition is well-founded, there is simply nothing for fictionalists to learn 
from.  
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Models, to Elgin and Goodman are instruments for understanding. Hence, as we have 
seen, their intense preoccupations with themes such as idealization, distortion, curve-
smoothing, ceteris paribus claims and simplification as well as languages and symbol 
systems are justified. They are committed to perspectivalism. Here, Bunge’s version falters, 
if numbers are brain children, so are atoms and stars. Only irrealist facetism resolves both 
sides. 
Both Elgin and Goodman have worked to distance themselves from hard relativism – 
the view that upon being confronted by God herself, the relativist claims, you are entitled to 
your opinion. Better versions are only a patch if we allow that we can learn from fictions. 
Recall: 
 Proposition 2—Arts and sciences employ fictions in the form of non-literal truths 
from which are gleaned understandings. 
We can amend it as follows: 
 Proposition 2—Arts and sciences often employ faceted narratives, sometimes in 
the form of approximations and sometimes in the form of non-literal sentences 
(metaphors) from which are gleaned understandings. 
32. The Dark Side. Nonetheless, there is a dark side to this story. If we are to 
understand the topic of agency we will need to bear in mind to what extent models, 
narratives, theories are used unethically. It is even very possible that representations are 
used more frequently for deception than for their contributions to understanding. The 
tendency to emphasize positive aspects and forget the negative is also very common in the 
literature on philosophy of language. Many modern philosophers of language are 
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influenced by epistemological concerns and tend to overlook many of the darker tendencies 
of the human animal.
154
 
No one is more articulate on this aspect of this topic than Chomsky.  We can look at 
the problem as follows: 
1) A representation R of everything E is everything ROE. 
2) EROE 
3) If ROE, then R differs from the target T by at least one feature F. 
4) If F is missing from any R we are prompted to ask why. 
 
This does not reduce everything to ideology because, I believe we have shown that 
even the most powerful scientific theory is irreal. Understanding leaves us wanting, but it is 
all we have. 
33. Models of Science Made Simple. I am not suggesting science is simple. But, 
scientists avoid the impossible.  
Assuming that we are fallible, we posit an objective world in contrast to the 
subjective perspective. As Elgin notes: “to be testable, science must use representations that 
are perspectival”. 155 Scientific models are never “utterly objective” but they are “objective” 
in a weaker sense “that they contain information that is invariant across representations of 
the same object”.156 Elgin is suggesting that scientific theories are irreal.  
We can recognize that concrete models are often realized as concrete physical 
objects. An example of a CmCt (concrete model and concrete target) relation is the 
architectural model that is involved in the creation of a real building (target). The relation 
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moves from CmAt (model/proposed building) to CmCt (model/real building) when the 
building is physically constructed.  
A related notion for abstract models which Nancy Cartwright provides is 
specification. To Cartwright, abstract models are ‘realized’ with specifications. 157 For 
example, h=1/2gt2  is realized by adding specific values.  
Cartwright’s Realization definition: Abstract model with specifications 
(realized):  we will abbreviate with Am
r 
If an imaginary stone is dropped from an imaginary building the event is modelled by 
h=1/2gt2. In this case we can classify the mathematics of this experiment as AmAt and 
AmrAt when the values in question are specified (in approximations e.g. h= 1/2gt2 with h = 
20 meters, and g = 10m/s2, we calculate  t = 2 seconds.). By actually dropping the stone we 
have AmrCt: time = 2 seconds. 158  
Connected to this is Cartwright’s suggestion that from a modelling principle like 
f=ma we can generate many other “interpretive models”— an example of which is 
h=1/2gt2. Cartwright calls these “bridge principles”. The idea is that there are a number of 
more ‘specific models’ which can model targets deriving from the very general modelling 
principle f=ma. 
Giere interprets Cartwright as saying that what a theory is “is to be identified with a 
set of fundamental principles (e.g. f=ma) plus a set of bridge principles (e.g. h=1/2gt2)” 159  
 “Representative models” represent aspects of the real world. 160 Giere prefers 
“representational models”. In this case, the relations involved are AmCt or CmCt.  
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We can imagine a fairly ideal situation for modelling gravitation. A rock perched 
precariously on the edge of a cliff suddenly topples due to erosion of the hardened sand 
supporting it. We can create a concrete (as opposed to abstract) scale model with a lump of 
clay and a sand plaster mixture for the cliff. What we have is a concrete model with 
specifications. The experiment can be carried out and a multiplier can be used to factor in 
the much smaller distance the lump of clay travels than does the real rock. This 
compensation occurs in special effects models for films all the time. Essentially the camera 
speed is adjusted (sped up) so that when the image is viewed the lump of clay falls in “slow 
motion” i.e. the lump of clay appears to fall the distance that the rock falls in approximately 
the same amount of time. If there is no actual rock and cliff scenario, but a real model is 
created, we can see this situation is a CmrAt. Similarly, if we only model the process 
mathematically by applying specifications to our “interpretative principles” we can view 
the situation as AmrAt. What we want to note from these examples however is that the 
falling rock and falling lump of clay are well-modelled events. Scientists have a fairly good 
command of this kind of event and we seem to understand something when we can arrive at 
a fairly good prediction.  
Giere provides an interesting example: He imagines a steel ball suspended by an 
electromagnet. When the ball is released, a timer begins and the ball lands on a switch 
which stops the timer. This is a fairly “regimented” system and we can arrive at more 
accuracy than say using a stop watch. The falling of the steel ball will be measurable by the 
same “interpretive principles”. However, no understanding of why the ball sticks to the 
electromagnet can be garnered by this modelling system. We need the “principles of 
electromagnetism” for that. We can even imagine, as Giere does, that we could slow the 
descent of the ball by using electromagnets placed along the line of descent. Again, we 
need the “principles of electromagnetism”. 
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A related reason for the popularity of Languages of Art is that Goodman emphasises 
the role of art in contributing to our understanding. Science does an excellent job 
explaining simpler systems but gets into difficulty regarding more complex systems, e.g. 
human behaviour. 
161
 In one way, this is the core of both Elgin’s and Goodman’s work. Art 
helps us to understand things science cannot. But this notion also figures in Chomsky’s 
work. “We will always learn more about human life and human personality 
from novels than from scientific psychology”. 162  
If we recall Giere’s example above of a suspended metal ball and electromagnet, we 
can see that some systems are far simpler than others by virtue of how we limit the systems. 
We can come to a fairly accurate prediction for the time it takes for the ball to fall. We have 
no way of modelling when and whether the scientist in question will or will not push the 
switch. Multiple models compound complexity. In this arena we are driven to rely on 
common sense. Our intuitions are no less valuable than our best science. 
We can now notice that while scientific representations contribute to our 
understanding in many and varied ways, we are ultimately left to our intuitions and feelings 
concerning complex aspects of human behaviour. Politics, the arts, the humanities 
therefore, differ substantially from the regimented world of scientific modelling and theory 
making. The targets cannot be regimented in such a way as to be modeled scientifically. 
This implies that while common sense relies on science on occasion, the ultimate guide in 
other realms are aspects that we can fairly attribute to human nature. As Homo sapiens we 
share capacities and concepts. We have deep intuitions for what it means, for example, to 
lie, to apologize or to be greedy. These are modelled in the realm of the arts in very 
successful ways. There is an isf ought. The isp is where did it come from. 
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I will therefore support the Strong Thesis over the Weak Thesis.  
Weak Thesis Statement—both the arts and sciences can contribute to 
understanding. They are invaluable forms which may always function in radically 
different ways on radically different domains.  
Strong Thesis Statement—the arts contribute to the understanding of a domain 
that is fundamentally inaccessible to the sciences. 
My primary reason for this relies on the idea that art can contribute to understanding 
with a very high degree of disorganization. Art teaches us to respect play in playing. 
Science teaches that we need play by working. 
Very loosely speaking, understanding is simply some kind of model-making of the 
world (whatever that is) by using some kind of language or if you prefer symbol system. In 
another way, Bunge expressed it as follows: “the conceptual conquest of reality starts, 
paradoxically enough, by idealizing it.
 163
  
I also think it should be reasonably uncontroversial to suggest science is a particular 
way of understanding i.e. using language and making models. Simply, a scientist’s use of 
language is specialized or if you will, a scientist strives to use language in a highly 
regimented way. As Elgin notes, “Natural science is rigorous. It does not use vague terms 
like ‘game’”.164 This is another way of expressing Sellars’ distinction between manifest 
image and scientific image.  
If my version of resolving the problem of fictionalism is successful, we may note that 
I cannot support the approaches of Giere and Cartwright on fictions in science. They are, in 
my view, both involved in the general muddle over genre and concept re: fiction.  
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34. Unregimented Quality of Natural Languages and the Relationship to 
Models. The original source of the distinction between regimented and unregimented 
language use is possibly Wittgenstein, (It also is the title of W. V. O. Quine’s 5th chapter in 
Word and Object) but Chomsky has contributed to making it central to the particular story 
of language he tells. The basic idea is that natural language use can be distinguished from 
the use of artificial languages which are regimented or formal or constructed for specific 
functions (symbol systems like musical notation, scientific and mathematical languages) 
predominantly because natural language is a “biological engine”165 and “part of our 
biological endowment”166 whereas regimented language is entirely made. Following 
Chomsky, natural language grows in our individual brains whereas we learn artificial 
languages in another way.
167
  
As a starting point, we will presume that natural languages are often used in 
unregimented ways — that they allow us an extraordinarily large range of subtly varied and 
necessarily creative possible ‘uses’.  
I can support this idea that natural language use is unregimented with a few 
examples: we can “re-build our houses” from scratch and “move London” without moving 
any buildings but we cannot “re-build [an automobile] motor that has been reduced to dust” 
(my emphasis).
168
 We can say of Jones, that he ‘is not’ the same man he used to be, or of 
Karl Marx, that he ‘is’ the most famous philosopher buried in Highgate cemetery. We can 
talk and think abstractly and/or concretely and we can shift freely about, all the while 
maintaining some uniformity of meaning and general comprehensibility. While these 
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ambiguous habits are not that problematic in natural language, they are simply not desirable 
in the sciences. 
Nonetheless, it would be too bold to assume that the function of natural language is to 
convey right representations of the world—a conclusion that appears regularly in the 
heavily epistemology-based tradition of philosophy of language—because we use our 
natural languages to do many other things as well. We make up stories, we tell lies 
(hopefully white) and we imagine alternate futures (preferably bright).  
For instance, Wittgenstein offers a surprising and oft quoted list expressing this 
unregimented quality of natural language use at aphorism §23 (“Play-acting— Singing 
catches— Guessing riddles” to name a few). He continues, we are “confus[ed] by the 
uniform appearance of words” (§11). Words are tools that we use to do many different 
things. Natural language has many parts and many “levers”. Wittgenstein’s consideration of 
the “blurry” and “unbounded” word game quoted above from Elgin, is an excellent 
example of this unregimented quality of natural language use (§70/§71).  
Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s response to his earlier work and to logicism regarding 
natural language is connected to this idea of rigidity or regimentation. We could say that 
natural language is elastic in a way that formal languages are not. Paul Pietroski describes 
natural language as “flexible” 169 and Wittgenstein warns us against “subliming language” 
(§38, /§81 /§94).  
Wittgenstein’s position on the question of meaning, however, is that they are to be 
found in “use” (§30, §43) within communities, and learned in a shared “form of life”. 
Moreover, for Wittgenstein, natural language is made or “founded on conventions” (§355) 
of “agreement” (§241) although it is clearly unregimented for him. His “private language 
argument” supports the idea that languages are the property (belongings) of our 
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communities. A preferable alternative would not imply that natural languages are in 
abstractly and vaguely defined communities but rather in the mind/brains of individuals. 
Still, we can gather from Wittgenstein that no theory of meaning can be developed from 
studying use. At best we can only describe what we do when we use unregimented 
languages. Regimented language use depends far more on community involvement than 
does unregimented language use. If we follow Chomsky on the matter, natural language is 
bound by the internalized structure of concept formation resulting in common sense. 
However, common sense cannot control scientific research. So, that is where the line which 
must be drawn. 
35. Regimentation: Scientific languages, mathematical symbol systems, logics, 
musical notation are examples of regimented languages. These languages (if we wish to 
call them all languages) are often very precise (musical notation does not have to be); they 
have very clear references, rules of inference, are rule-governed and require community 
based standards. They are not however models of (or for) natural language.
170
 Construing 
natural languages as though they are founded on logic was a common tendency in the early 
20
th
 century following Frege, (see the early work of Wittgenstein and of the positivists).  
Nonetheless, there is no study of natural language present in logicism, rather, what we 
observe, is some inverted attempt to grow natural language from some logical model. On 
the contrary we could ask: in what sense is there any empirical justification for this type of 
project? And does logicism leave any room for the other various linguistic elements 
(thinking, worrying, ruminating, acting and fantasizing etc.) which simply cannot be 
handled by regimented symbol systems?
171
 I am not suggesting that logic is irrelevant to 
‘meaning’.  
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This idea of describing natural languages as though they are built from logical 
languages can seem very compelling. We might think we would be more likely to agree on 
political and moral fronts if we could be more unified linguistically or if we could 
communicate with greater precision.    Following Frege we could believe that signs stand 
for things and with a handful logical operators, we might succeed in explaining meaning 
and possibly improving communication. The process would be a simple act of translation. 
In science this is clearly advantageous. It makes sense to represent Hydrogen with the letter 
H precisely because what makes science successful is that it names a concept or object 
within very specific parameters. However, where natural language is concerned, there is 
nothing about the idea of regimentation which is preferable or even achievable.  
Moreover, if we consider logical operators (Frege was responsible for creating the 
early versions), the problem for natural language is compounded in infinitely subtle ways. 
Consider identity as an example. Some might argue that ‘a = a’ means ‘a is equal to a’, or 
that ‘=df’ is a proper replacement for ‘means’. Ever since Quine, Goodman and White wrote 
their series of papers deflating the distinction between analytic and synthetic, most 
philosophers have been sceptical regarding translations like these. Contrarily to the thesis 
of regimentation of natural language, Wittgenstein wondered about the statement: “war is 
war”172. Which logical operator can we use to translate the ‘is’ in that case? How about 
“love is in the air”? — How about “Freedom is just another word for nothing left to lose”? 
Clearly, identity (, ) and definition (=df) hardly reflect the variety of natural language 
uses for this one tiny word ‘is’. I prefer Bunge’s operator for modelling over identity. But, 
identity is always ceteris paribus.  
And even if one could replace every possible use of ‘is’ with logical operators, what 
would be the point of the exercise? The kind of identity that Frege was attempting to 
describe is adapted to the specific purposes of logic and mathematics. Meaning of the 
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subtle kind we are hoping to understand and indeed cherish is simply incompatible with 
regimented languages.  
To emphasize these points I reiterate: natural language simply does not grow out of 
logic, if anything, the process is reversed. We are biological creatures that communicate 
and think using what Chomsky terms our mind/brains while some among us develop and 
use mathematical and scientific languages. Nevertheless, formal logic cannot be regarded 
as the model for natural language precisely because regimented languages are designed, 
constructed, and artificial — they are developed to reduce both ambiguity and flexibility. 
None of these qualities completely reflects the creative endowment of the human 
mind/brain.
 
In effect, our creative minds imagine and developed these specialized 
languages. They are at the core of scientific methodology which has been central to this 
paper.  
36. The Reference Problem.  I make no  attempt to define ‘reference’ here other 
than to describe it by stating that people use certain words (lexical items) to talk about and 
think about concrete things (roughly living or non-living) as well as abstract things 
(historical, sets of things, numbers).
 173
 We do this in common sense situations to ask for 
puppies or permissions, and in regimented practices like set theory when referring to 
“concepts such as ALEPH-NULL”. 174  
What goes on when we refer to things in the world or even to abstract ideas in our 
heads? Do referring-words ‘connect to’ things in the world (referents)? Chomsky warns us 
against this manoeuvre: first, “words do not refer [people do]” and second “there is no 
[Fregean] word-thing relation”. 175 Similarly, McGilvray points out regarding words, that 
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they are used by people, often “in similar ways; [and they] come to be related to the world. 
But they do neither by themselves”. 176 Part of why words cannot refer to things out there is 
simply that there are no given objects out there, distilled of our interests in them. Similarly 
there is no “platonic form” or concept or “mode of presentation” out there. However, there 
is evidence for there being internal concepts from which we organize sentences with 
meanings. This brings us to our final topic. 
37. The Domain of Isp and Politics. I have primarily argued that to a greater or 
lesser degree every mental construct is irreal. In my communications with Chomsky over 
the years I have to admit, this was bothersome for him. In many ways we just do not speak 
this way and Chomsky returns to concepts that are innate. He would find the statement, for 
example, we must treat sick children as if they exist garish. But, there seems to be no 
alternative to this approach, because, things like corporations exist. We may wish to draw a 
line between concrete and abstract but the damage that unregulated corporations do is real. 
We must therefore treat corporations as if they do exist. Furthermore, we must recognize 
that there are peoples. These peoples can be organised, for example, into unions, they 
express their rights over territories in the case of Canadians. They can live under an 
imposed constitution e.g. the Québécois. They can live without passports as the Palestinians 
do. It is important to note that the corrupt and powerful use the argument that these are all 
unreal abstractions as form of propaganda. They often argue that the Québécois people or 
the Palestinian people are mere fictions.  The result of this kind of argument is simply to 
make people what Chomsky calls “unpeople”. I would, therefore respond, it is preferable to 
treat a person as if she exists than to treat her as if she does not exist and the same holds for 
peoples. Peoples exist in the way that things like peoples exist. 
The actual problem lies in the simple fact that we categorize as an aspect of our 
ability to understand. We can pretend to avoid it, but this only creates more problems. As 
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anti-corporatists (nominalists) we could argue contrarily that there are only individuals. But 
then, can we not notice some are hungrier than others? And those among us who are 
hungry; are they not the hungry people?  
Isp’s can be thought of by how pressing they are. We may believe that the Cosmos 
was created by God, but it does not obviously help us cure cancer.  The universe may be 
made of mind, but the child who goes hungry is not obviously helped by our belief in this 
idea. I am not denying that the notion of God is clearly unfaceted.  
While scientific objects are understood to be irreal objects, there are good reasons to 
trust them. They work.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper I posit that fictionalism, which can be described by the notion that we glean 
understandings from fictions in the form of non-literal truth is based on a category mistake. 
I nonetheless, support irrealism (i.e. the metaphysical consequence of perspectivalism) on 
the grounds that it entails fallibilism (agnosticism regarding the real).  
I further argued that we must treat all faceted narratives as if they do exist. And these 
include everything from numbers, nations, and neutrinos to peoples, pandas and 
permissions. While these things may ultimately contradict one another ontologically, they 
remain well-faceted and therefore are of practical significance and theoretical interest.  
Finally, whether this is justifiable or not remains to be evaluated, however, I suggest we 
avoid using the word ‘fiction’ when referring to the concept fiction, as if it were a noun but 
continue to do so when referring to the genre. 
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